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
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Recognizing the Other's Appeal: Levinas's Contribution to the Discourse on Multiculturalism

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ABSTRACT: This paper provides an account of Levinas's contribution to the discourse on multiculturalism. It argues that the recognition of what he calls as the ethical appeal of the other's face is the necessary starting point in discussions relating to the issue of cultural pluralism. Demands for the recognition of the dignity of each individual can no longer rely on a credible notion of subjectivity and freedom. An individual's worth is not to be grounded in the idea of autonomy but instead in the ethical signification revealed in the face. However, the Levinasian understanding of the other has been criticized as an abstraction. The paper defends Levinas's insight by arguing that there is a distinction between the other and the way she manifests herself and that there are different and concrete ways through which Levinas speaks of the other and the self.

KEYWORDS: Levinas, multiculturalism, recognition, face, difference, identity

Introduction

Albert Dondeyne (1963, 166) remarks that our contemporary world is characterized by a growing sense of historicity and solidarity primarily because “the world is becoming one” and that humankind is now faced “with the greatest task ever—the task of building an economic and social world in which there is *room for all*.” Dondeyne highlights the inescapable character of our time and the formidable challenge that we face. While it is true that the world is coming together as more lines of communication and transaction become available—thanks to modern

technologies—we also find ourselves in societies that are increasingly characterized by difference and diversity. The existence of differences is not only a fact but a potential source of misunderstandings and conflicts. At the root and at stake in these conditions are those particularities that make us who we are, that is, our identities (Kymlicka 1995, 1-5).

Recent decades have seen a great deal of discussions about creating societies in which people of diverse cultural backgrounds, traditions, religious commitments, languages, and so on, can peacefully coexist. However, anyone who engages in such debates and discussions must be aware of how daunting the task is. At a time when supposedly nobody can claim access to a world of eternal ideas or values (cf. also Sartre 1965, 40-41), it appears that we are left with only particular conceptions of the true, the good, and the beautiful. The latter will come into play in our attempts to live in plural societies, in making decisions that have repercussions beyond the present, and in our efforts to become who we are among others. These others are, likewise, trying not only to maintain themselves in some decent manner of existence, but also to forge their own identities. In an age when grand metaphysical narratives have lost their credibility (Lyotard 1999, 34 and 37), how do we even begin to talk about the possibility of a truly just pluralistic societies?

What we aim to do in this paper is to explore the contribution of the French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas to the discourse on multiculturalism. We will argue that in working toward such just pluralistic societies, a certain manner of “seeing” the other person, one that has recognized the latter’s irreducibility and inviolability, is necessary. In other words, we will argue that envisioning and building a world where there is room for all require the basic recognition of what Levinas calls as the radical alterity of the other. The paper will proceed in four steps. Firstly, we will provide the context for our discussion by considering some of the concerns raised by the well-known essay “The Politics of Recognition” in which Charles Taylor speaks of how identity and recognition are linked. Secondly, we will discuss Levinas’s accounts of the encounter with the other, underlining the ethical signification revealed by the other’s face. Thirdly, we will try to see whether or not Levinas’s understanding of the other can withstand the critique of Rudi Visker who

argues that Levinas’s other is too abstract to be a real concrete other. Visker’s criticism will be addressed by clarifying the difference between the other and the way the face reveals itself. Fourthly, we will close our essay with a short conclusion.

Recognition and Identity

In his essay “The Politics of Recognition,” Taylor (1992) explains that identity is never formed in solitude but rather always and continuously in a “dialogical” way. Part of our definition of ourselves comes from our dealings with and even resistance to others. The fact that identity is formed dialogically implies that one is, in an important sense, dependent on others: Recognition received from others plays an essential role in identity-constitution, both on the individual and social levels. Just as children come to have an image of themselves through interactions with their parents and significant others, fully grown individuals and collectivities can come to understand themselves through the eyes of those with whom they interact. Taylor (1992, 32) explains that on the personal level: “We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression.” Though ideally one should be able to eventually define oneself on one’s own, one can never totally divorce oneself from the influence of others. Personal identity will always be expressed before and negotiated “through dialogue, partly overtly, partly internal, with others” (Taylor 1992, 34).

Such is the importance of recognition that the lack of it (nonrecognition) and the failure to see another’s worth (misrecognition), which is often coupled with the imposition on individuals and groups of a demeaning picture of themselves, adversely affect both their self-esteem and the way they regard their convictions and culture. Take women, blacks, and the formerly colonized peoples who suffered from both nonrecognition and misrecognition as an example. They have imbibed pictures of themselves as inferior, evil, or uncivilized to the point that they themselves became instruments of their subjugation and exploitation. *Uncle Tom’s cabin* (Stowe 1995), for instance,

gives us a glimpse of how black slaves became as cruel as their masters or came to regard themselves as wicked or good for nothing because of the way they were dealt with by their oppressors.

In a time when societies are becoming more multicultural along with an increasing awareness of the link between identity formation and recognition, there is also a strong demand both for the institutionalization of measures that will ensure the survival of distinct and often minority groups and for the recognition of the worth of their cultural creations, customs, languages, and so on (Kymlicka 1995). Taylor observes that beneath these demands lies a certain convergence of the politics of equal dignity and the politics of difference. The former assumes equal dignity for all persons regardless of race, color, religion, and so on (and which would thus also advocate the difference-blind application of law), while the latter calls for the recognition of a people's particularities and their collective goal of survival. Taylor notes that the politics of difference has grown out of or is based on the idea of the equal dignity of all individuals, each of whom is seen as a rational agent capable of determining the course of her life or of forging her own unique identity. As such, the politics of equal dignity relies on a certain understanding of the human individual.

Here, Levinas's claims about freedom and the human individual take on great significance. What seems to be decisive in the conception of the human being as implied in the politics of equal dignity is the individual's freedom to exert effort in order to realize a certain kind of fullness. Now along with his critique of autonomy as arbitrary and as being in need of justification, Levinas claims that the aims of free human action have been shown to be inconsistent with its consequences. The disastrous results of the actions of humankind in the horrible moments of the last century have cast doubt on the centrality and primacy of the human being understood as a self-grounding autonomous rational agent, that is, a subject legislating for itself or a will that wills its own will. While this is not to say that we are not free or that freedom should be undermined, what has to be asked, Levinas claims, is whether or not autonomy really ensures the individual's dignity and makes her worthy of respect. Is there

not something else about the human person apart from and beyond autonomy that compels one to respect her, to acknowledge her worth?

The Appeal of the Other’s Face

In *Totality and infinity*, Levinas (1999, 134) describes the emergent ego as having the tendency to be narrowly self-concerned—“entirely deaf to the Other, outside of all communication and all refusal to communicate—without ears, like a hungry stomach.” It struggles to achieve separation, autonomy, and sovereignty in a milieu full of non-Is, that is, things and “fruits of the earth” that can be exploited and enjoyed. This characterization is reflected in our ordinary lives where the effort to realize ourselves as persons leads us to achieve a level of self-sufficiency that possibly becomes oblivious to others. Indeed, this is what the Heideggerian understanding of *Dasein* partly means for Levinas: The human being is the being for whom her own being is an issue (Heidegger 1996, 10). She tends to persevere in and care only for her own existence. It may be objected that this is not true in all instances. We also pursue not only our own fulfillment and happiness but also that of those who belong to our circle of family and close friends. Nevertheless, this is still problematic. Our family and close friends are, in a sense, not totally other insofar as they are still treated as part of the home or the economy that we have established around ourselves. We take care of them partly because they are *like us*, or perhaps because *like them* we are bound to a certain context, history, bloodline, or some common interests.

Moreover, in daily life we normally approach other people obliquely, that is, through our social roles. We come across individuals with whom we “do business.” We deal with bus drivers, librarians, students, waiters, vendors, among other individuals. It can even come to a point where we no longer see persons beyond their function or role, where we tend to reduce them to physical appearance, skin color, race, and so on. The other then becomes either a useful element in the fulfillment of our needs and desires, or a challenging obstacle that we try to overcome. Reduction to the same,

exploitation, manipulation are the things we do to relative non-Is that yield to our grasping hand and intellect with little resistance and nearly without complaint. But, as Levinas (1987, 50) points out, are other persons “given to us” in the same way that things are?

By describing how another approaches or “appears” to the I, Levinas shows how and why other human persons are radically different from the things that we can assimilate or reduce to ourselves. He speaks of the confrontation with the “face” of the other, an event that is more than a perceptual experience since, as Levinas himself clarifies, “face” here does not mean only and primarily the physical countenance. In a short confessional essay, Levinas (1997, 8) makes it clear (though still in a rather ontological language) that the face is not only a piece of flesh:

The face is not the mere assemblage of a nose, a forehead, eyes, etc.; it is all that, of course, but takes on the meaning of a face through the new dimension it opens up in the perception of a being....The face is an irreducible mode in which being can present itself in its identity.

The face of the other is the way by which another person “shows” or reveals herself as such. By the term “face,” Levinas wants to convey precisely that which is invisible, not only partly or temporarily, but radically and absolutely. While he speaks of the “epiphany” of the face, the other, strictly speaking, “cannot be seen” and gives herself only as one who essentially withdraws (Levinas 1987, 28). Though we may be standing close to an individual whose body is clearly present and visible, the other as such is “elsewhere,” remains elusive, invisible, an ungraspable mystery, in short—an enigma (Levinas 1996, 70). The other as other remains invisible, and thus is not like other phenomena that are captured by our concepts and descriptions. Moreover, the face appears in its nakedness. This does not mean that we see a physical face devoid of make-up or that is unadorned by a mask, but that we are before this particular other person whose vulnerability and weakness are revealed to me. In being confronted by the face, another person is revealed beyond her physical countenance, the color of her eyes and skin, her context. The other appeals to us not to reduce her to any of these features.

The epiphany of the face of the other is a moral experience. In the effort to realize itself, secure and prolong its enjoyment, maintain its identity with itself, the I is like a force on the go that may be victimizing those others on its path. But the questioning face of the other halts our force and violence. In the face-to-face encounter, we are confronted by another person who resists reduction to a concept and/or to an object of use and enjoyment, to her function, physical traits and characteristics, history, race, among other things. The face of the other eludes our grasp and gaze, speaks and issues the command “Thou shall not kill” (Levinas 1999, 216). This prohibition does not at all prevent us from inflicting violence upon and/or murdering the other, since we remain the same and autonomous while we face the resistance of what really has no resistance, the other who we can still easily crush. While the face of the other commands, it can only beg or make an appeal. The face-to-face situation is morally charged because we are there presented with the choice of either recognizing and responding to this appeal or of turning our back on the vulnerable other, pretending that we did not hear her call.

The face of each human person we encounter seeks the recognition of her alterity, transcendence, and irreducibility, regardless of that individual’s skin color, gender, religion, and so on, and regardless of what this particular other in this situation actually wants or says. This respect for alterity demanded by the other can be seen to be required by the recognition of the dignity of each human individual, which, as we have seen above in our consideration of Taylor, is at the base of the demand for the recognition of particularities and the worth of a minority or ethnic group’s cultural productions. The way the other manifests herself, the fact that she reveals herself on her own, and that she addresses us prompts us to recognize an elusive “reality” that we cannot just reduce to ourselves. Before the face, we are made to realize the non-primacy of the I and the other’s “infinity.” It is this radical alterity and irreducibility of the other that must be recognized even before we come to a discussion of equal rights and the particularities and cultural products that we want to be acknowledged and sustained. It is not that the latter are not worthy of consideration, but that we come to a proper understanding of them and their basis in light of the more fundamental demand of the face. This

recognition of the other is a precondition of genuine communication, that is, of both the dialogues that involve individuals whose culture, convictions, or religious covenant we do not share, and the discussions and debates about the rights and demands of various groups.

The crucial point here is the way the other is seen. As Levinas (1972, 30) reminds us, all cultural productions presuppose the other, not only as “collaborator and neighbor of our cultural work of expression or client of our artistic production, but interlocutor: The one to whom expression expresses, for whom celebration celebrates, he who is both the term of an orientation and first signification.” Levinas’s main message here is that the point of departure of considerations regarding others and their cultures is the other herself being an interlocutor, as someone who comes to presence in a manner that tells us to respect her. In this connection, Wanda Deifelt points out that actual communication already presupposes the fact that the other has announced herself, that we have already been confronted by the other. She writes: “For Levinas, dialogue begins with the ethical interruption of the other: [T]here is no self outside the response to otherness, to the claims posed by the other” (Deifelt 2007, 117). She goes on to endorse an intercultural ethics the starting point of which is an awareness of and sensitivity to otherness, “an ethics attentive to difference, open to dialogue, and willing to learn from others” (Deifelt 2007, 118). Such an ethics begins with the humble admission that the other is beyond our complete grasp and thus with the awareness of our owing the other respect.

The same insight, the same starting point is vital in envisioning and discussing just and peaceful multicultural societies. We cannot justifiably claim that Levinas’s basic point can be employed to solve all issues linked to multiculturalism, but that it should come into play in our relations with others and in discussions of the politics of recognition. Note that Levinas brings his insights about the I’s non-centrality and the other’s infinity to the social level. He recognizes the fact that there is always the “third party” or the third face that in turn questions our relation with an other and thus prevents it from degenerating into a selfish private affair. Given the presence of innumerable others who also appeal to us, we have to move on to reflections on the level

of justice. The presence of other faces that likewise demand our recognition ushers in the need for synchronizing consciousness, theory, science, order, prioritization, rational planning, government, institutions, and so on. All of these are to be grounded in the encounter with the face and they will always be subject to the face’s critique. It is on this level that the consideration of the demands of diverse groups would most properly occur.

An Other too Abstract?

Though Levinas’s account of the other has been recognized as contributing to discussions and theorizations of our relations with others in this time of culturally diversified societies, its suitability for dealing with issues of multiculturalism has been called into question. There are commentators who think that despite Levinas’s emphasis on the other, on ethics, and on the respect that the face demands, his insights cannot be employed in approaching issues relating to multiculturalism and the idea of just pluralistic societies. Rudi Visker is one of them.

At the outset, it must be mentioned that Visker criticizes the grounds of Levinasian thought. Visker believes, for example, that Levinas’s ethics ultimately relies on a metaphysics that necessitates the use of words like “God” and “creation.” While Levinas describes the encounter with the other as an ethical disturbance that provokes shame on the part of the subject, Visker (2000, 268) argues that in this very confrontation “another scene breaks through,” which is *creatio ex nihilo*. Visker observes that the condition of the possibility of the ethical encounter with the other, meaning what enables us to hear the appeal of the face, is what seems to be a prior and more original relation with God. He writes: “At the bottom of the ethical relation, presupposed by it and enacted through it, shines the shy light of creation” (Visker 2000, 11). Visker (2000, 270) declares too that “[c]reation is thus for Levinas the first moment of the trauma.” He does not think that Levinas’s ethics can be divorced from the kind of metaphysics in which it is grounded, and thus also from what appears to be a religious vocabulary employed in Levinas’s philosophical writings. Visker (2000, 12) argues that

uprooting the ethics of Levinas from such moorings “will inevitably reduce Levinas’s philosophy to the caricature that unfortunately still circulates: [E]normous claims, and at best endearing moralism, but floating in thin air.” One then can accept such an ethics along with its presuppositions. If one cannot pay such a price, Visker (2000, 11-12) tells us: “[O]ne should perhaps wonder whether what one wants is really this kind of ethics. And one could, then, perhaps start to question some of its premises.” But, more than this opposition to the grounds of Levinas’s thought, Visker criticizes the latter’s view of the face of the other.

In speaking of the current trend in contemporary philosophy to give pride of place to the other and the relation that binds us to her, Visker says that the notions we are employing, particularly those of the self and the other, need to be rethought. He contends that the Levinasian other who reveals herself in the face is too abstract to be a “truly other Other, that is, an other who is a stranger to me because he is the bearer of *a strangeness beyond the scope of my sensitivity*” (Visker 2006, 12; italics mine). For Visker, each individual is attached to an inner core that is constituted by one’s culture and history and which determines one as a person. An other here and now would presumably want to be recognized as an individual bearing particular physical and cultural traits. As Visker (1997, 161) remarks: “What the Other wants is for me to recognize him as a *singular* Other, not because of his characteristics (which he shares with others, thus making him ‘replaceable’), but not detached from his characteristics either (for that too makes him ‘replaceable’).” He suggests that an awareness of our rivetedness to this strangeness or inner core and to all our visible and particular traits is awakened by the disturbing confrontation with the other who is likewise attached to and determined by such an internalized form or context. Visker makes a distinction between “understanding” the other and being moved by her appeal. It is highly possible that, owing to our attachment to our horizon or culture—and not merely because of an insensitivity grounded in a refusal to move out of ourselves, though we see how different the other and her culture are from us and our own context—we will not hear her appeal. Shame is not the only reaction that the other can elicit from us. We may be insensitive to the other’s appeal, not because

of a selfish insensitivity or a narrow concern for ourselves, but because we do not really understand “where the other is coming from,” that is, her context, values, culture, among others. For Visker, Levinas underestimates the fact that I and the other bear a culture and concrete particularities that, though not of our own choosing, determine us nevertheless. This emphasis on the recognition of the particularities and distinctiveness of the other is something that multicultural policies, for example, are based upon. In fact, what cultural groups are fighting for is equal recognition on the basis of their distinct identities.

While we welcome Visker’s reminder of the rootedness of the other, we do not think Levinas can be accused of forgetting the other’s concreteness and particularity. We agree with Visker that Levinas does say that the other’s “face is abstract or naked” (1972, 31-32). It appears in its nudity and this nakedness is, according to Levinas (1972, 32) himself, “a stripping with no cultural ornament—an absolution.” The face appears in an absolute way: It absolves itself from any and all determinations. Levinas (1972, 32) says further that “the signification of the face in its abstraction is, in the literal sense of the term, extraordinary, exterior to all order, to all world.” The meaning of the face then exceeds or is outside of any form, history, or context. The preconceptions determined by these are put into question by the signification that we receive from the epiphany of the other.

Levinas insists on the description of the face as exceeding form because he has seen the dangers of attachment, rootedness, and reduction to form, history, or context. Levinas (1990, 232) points out that attachment to a ground, place, or context divides persons into “us” and “them,” natives and strangers, those who are the same and those who are treated as outsiders because they are different. Only a certain “uprootedness” enables us “to perceive men outside the situation in which they are placed, and [to] let the human face shine in all its nudity” (Levinas 1990, 233). Elsewhere, Levinas (2003, 68-70) tells us that at the root of the atrocities of the Holocaust was Hitlerism, a kind of thinking that employed a reductive gaze that rivets the other to her body, blood, and race—a gaze that allowed and justified the murder of the other. What Levinas offers, and which could be of much use

in discussions of multiculturalism, is a view of the worth of each individual that avoids reductionism (since human dignity is not grounded in any supposition of a superior body or blood or race) and which is rooted in the primary experience of the face's demand for respect.

Visker (2004, 12) asks: "Is the Other really someone whose alterity does not follow from the characteristics which make him/her other? Could it not with more right be asserted that, instead of being 'signification without context', the Other is 'not without' context, 'not without' qualities?"

We do not disagree with Visker regarding the other's situatedness and her being the bearer of characteristics that set her apart from others. The other we encounter is always with qualities, comes from a certain background, and the encounter itself happens in a particular context. What we do disagree with is Visker's argument that when the face shines or signifies beyond context then it would mean that the other we meet is context-less. Following the logic of Levinas's insights, we argue that his point misses something. The fact that Levinas is fundamentally opposed to the *reduction* of the other to form, context, the body, and history already presupposes that he clearly understands that the individual assumes form, lives in a context, is attached to a body and part of history. When Levinas warns against limiting our regard of the other to some of her aspect or feature, then it somehow tells us that he recognizes the other's particularity. More importantly, a distinction has to be made between the situated other and the way this other shows herself to us. As Levinas puts it: "[T]he epiphany of the Other bears its own significance, independent of the signification received from the world. *The Other not only comes to us from a context* but signifies by itself without that mediation" (Levinas 1972, 31; italics mine). It is clear that Levinas does not deny that the other bears properties, culture, and is thus "in the world." What he does say is that the person *appears* as other, the face reveals beyond form or context, and that it is a revelation that indicates an ethical demand exceeding and/or preceding every particular and culturally determined claim. Now while there is a distinction between the situated other and the ways by which the other reveals herself, there is no disjunction between the self-giving and the self that gives of itself. The other is the concrete, situated other

who gives or shows herself in such a unique “absolute” manner. Regardless of her cultural background, skin color, religious beliefs, and so on, the look of this other facing us now tells us that we owe her respect.

In addition to the foregoing points, note too that Levinas speaks of the other as this particular human person addressing us; the other is “the stranger, the widow, and the orphan” who appeals for our response. In his later writings, Levinas speaks of the other as the neighbor, the first who has approached us, the near one. In *Otherwise than being* (Levinas 1981), he speaks of a primordial saying that precedes everything being said. This saying is understood as the pre-original approach of the other or the “proximity of the one to the other” (Levinas 1981, 5). Moreover, Levinas has always understood the human person as embodied. He speaks of the rivetedness of the I to being and thus to its body in *On escape* (Levinas 2003); the I’s enjoyment and its achievement of separation in the mode of the body in *Totality and infinity*; and the subject’s being in proximity with the other as exposedness and sensibility in *Otherwise than being* (Levinas 1981, 100; see also Rolland 2003, 29-31).

More importantly, Levinas is clearly aware that the other is met as “somebody,” as a particular embodied individual. If this were not the case, Levinas would not tell us to avoid focusing only on the physical features, the countenance the other bears, that is, on what one sees or perceives. Doing so risks being unable to meet the other as such: “You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes” (Levinas 1995, 86). Let us not forget that Levinas has likewise pointed out the necessary economic and thus material dimension of the response to the appeal of the face of the other. Neglect of this renders our attempt to assume responsibility empty at best and hypocritical at worst. It would perhaps be going too far to claim that for Levinas “our only attachments are those we have to the Other” (Visker 2004, 33). Such an assertion is certainly different from the claim that the relation with the other is a fundamental one. Being related to the other does not in any way suggest that the other here is devoid of context, body, and particular

distinguishing features. We have seen that for Levinas, the other is she who I encounter in concrete situations, an other who bears physical and psychic traits, a particular self-understanding and history, problems and sufferings—and yet manifests herself in a way that keeps us from reducing her to any one thing that she bears.

Conclusion

We saw in our discussion that there is a strong link between identity and recognition: Identity—personal or shared—is formed partly by the recognition received from others. The histories of women, blacks, the Jewish people and the formerly colonized evince that the lack of recognition or the imposition of a demeaning image upon an individual or group damages those who experience subjection, indifference, and neglect. Awareness of both the connection between identity and recognition and the dangers of non-recognition and misrecognition fuels the demand for the recognition of each one's rights and particularities. We tried, however, to bring attention to a more fundamental demand for recognition that underlies the exigency to acknowledge equal dignity and cultural differences. We turned to Levinas's account of the epiphany of the other's face, which signifies beyond form or context, questions our autonomy and totalizing existence, and commands and pleads that we recognize the other's alterity, invisibility and irreducibility. Then against Visker who alleges that Levinas's other is an abstraction, we clarified by saying that when the face manifests itself beyond form it does not mean that the other lacks context and individuation. While the other is embodied, in a context and in history, and is encountered in real and concrete situations, the face pierces through form as the other reveals herself. We also said that even prior to and/or apart from the other's expression of what she wants, the face appeals for recognition.

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Perspectives on the Negotiated Status of Filipino Irregular Migrants in Japan

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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the contradictory positions of the state on the treatment of immigrants and irregular migrants. It does so by reflecting on the case study of five Filipino irregular migrants in Japan. Just as any other modern democratic state faced with migration issues, Japan on the one hand needs to regulate migration inflows including irregular channels, and on the other hand protects its citizens and non-citizens alike within its borders, including “illegal aliens.” Underlying this contradiction is the question of the cost of liberalizing immigration. While doing so is in accordance with international conventions and other human rights instruments, it can have an impact on the economic, cultural, and political life of the state. The paper examines this “liberal paradox” within which most host countries, including Japan, find themselves and its impact on future immigration policies.

KEYWORDS: Japan, migration, human rights, sovereignty, state, citizens

Introduction

Six women dressed as nuns caught by immigration officials at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Manila made the headline in May of 2011. They were headed for Hong Kong for a seminar, they claimed, but eventually confessed that they were bound for Lebanon to work illegally as maids (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2011). News like this

is common in the Philippines. A very long queue of migrant workers at the international airport terminal is a normal scene for travelers to and from the capital city. As observed in the last five years, about 2,000 to 3,000 Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) are deployed every day for employment abroad on a contractual basis. As suggested by government statistics, the number is rising. For instance, in 2002 alone, a total of 636,000 contract workers left the country (Tyner 2004). The figure almost doubled in 2005 when 988,615 Filipinos were deployed to over 180 receiving countries. Recent estimates suggest that about a million Filipinos are still employed abroad annually despite the worsening economic recession affecting the whole world (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration [POEA] 2012).

As one of the top labor exporters in the world, with around 10 percent of the country's population living and/or working abroad, current estimates suggest that over nine million Filipinos live outside the country, including a million irregular migrants (Commission on Filipinos Overseas [CFO] 2012). Studies have also shown that a huge percentage of OFWs is deployed in the Middle East (largely in Saudi Arabia), while many others are working in Asia, mainly in Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as in South Korea and Japan (National Statistics Office [NSO] 2012). These numbers only show the documented migrants. The number could be higher as global data on irregular migration is inaccurate and unreliable (Koser 2005). In fact, estimates suggest that of the million or so irregular Filipino workers abroad, about 300,000 are in Asia, mostly in East Asian countries (CFO 2012).

In periods of economic recession, recipient countries automatically resort to stricter migration control on the pretext of maintaining social stability. They restrict the entry of migrants, claiming that migration is a growing problem for their country and citizenry, and more often than not, speed up the process of detaining and deporting illegal migrants. In 2009, the Philippines's Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) confirmed that more than a thousand OFWs languished in jails and immigration detention centers abroad, an unpleasant plight for these workers who are hailed by the state as the "saviors" of the Philippine economy through the billions of dollars in remittances they send annually from across the globe (NSO 2011).

Moreover, the DFA reported in July of 2004 that 2,856 Filipinos were imprisoned in fifty-six states, with 1,115 in Saudi Arabia alone. At the end of that year, the same office noted that at least 4,775 Filipinos were still “languishing in foreign jails, and of these, 1,103 were women.” Most of them were detained for violating immigration laws. The crackdown in Sabah, Malaysia in 2005 led to the detention of at least 1,200 Filipinos. In 2009, DFA issued another statement that there were still some 3,000 Filipinos jailed in different countries around the world. This figure has not changed that much since 1998 when records showed that 2,091 Filipinos were in foreign jails for various offenses (Kyodo News 1999). About 70 percent of the detainees faced immigration-related charges and were deported after serving their brief sentences. The rest were in custody for committing common crimes, including theft and drug trafficking. In the Middle East alone, sixty-two OFWs were detained for drug-related charges in 2009. Of that number, forty-three, mostly women, were in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In 2005, a number of detention centers in Asia had Filipinos jailed, including those in Saudi Arabia (213), Kuwait (forty-seven), Singapore (192), Hong Kong (seventy-seven), and Japan (314), among others. More recent estimates suggest that the figure is relatively unchanging (Bulatlat 2005; Esplanada 2009). In 2011, three Filipinos were convicted of drug trafficking in China and were sentenced to death while many others are still detained for serious criminal charges.

Up until 2004, Japan has been one of the top major destinations of Filipino migrant workers in Asia mostly for work related to entertainment, second only to Hong Kong which attracts mainly household/domestic work (Kondo 2008). Moreover, in terms of money remittances to the Philippines, Japan comes fourth among the top ten countries in the list (POEA 2012). Yet, despite the decreasing inflow of migrants from the Philippines, many of those affected by stricter immigration laws had overstayed. Some of them utilized their spouse’s visa to extend their stay in Japan, a means by which a number of Filipino women migrants in the Philippines used to enter Japan. The CFO reported that of the total percentage of emigrants who have alien spouses abroad, about 30 percent resides in Japan (a total of 108,245 emigrants

from 1989 to 2009). While many others came to Japan through the usual legal processes, still others were forced by their economic circumstances and fell prey to illegal recruitment. At present, Japan's Ministry of Justice (MOJ) (2012) categorizes these migrants as "illegal workers." The MOJ further reports that the Philippines is second to China in the number of irregular migrants (around 20 percent). The data also noted that while irregular male workers were more concentrated in factories and construction work, female irregular migrants were highly concentrated in the entertainment industries working as bar attendants, hostesses, and the like. The statistics only shows the documented cases that were eventually subjected to deportation procedures. Interestingly, many other irregular migrants managed to escape this expulsion procedure due to their special circumstances (Leerkes and Broeders 2010). They inadvertently capitalized on this "special procedure" as provided for by the Japanese immigration law.

This paper primarily examines the contradictory positions of the state on the treatment of immigrants and irregular migrants in Japan by reflecting on five cases of Filipino irregular migrants. Numerous studies have been conducted on the contradictory role of the state in the face of migration issues. While it needs to regulate migration inflows including irregular channels, it has to protect both its citizens and non-citizens within its border, including "illegal aliens" (Chung 2010). The current contradiction underscores the problem of whether or not immigration laws must be liberalized. Although doing so manifests compliance with international conventions on human rights and adherence to principles of international interdependence, it can have an impact on the cultural, economic, moral, and political life of the host state.

This study borrows the concept of "negotiated citizenship" as suggested by Stasiulis and Bakan (2003) who argue that non-citizens or migrants in general have gained rights and privileges previously granted exclusively to the citizens of the host country through "a network of sustained linkages that evince their transnational existence." Such discourse has been expounded by researchers on citizenship and immigration including the processes engaged by irregular migrants in negotiating their status with host countries (Parreñas 2001; Ball and Piper 2002; Ellermann 2010; Leerkes and Broeders 2010).

Finally, this paper seeks to describe the interplay of migration-institutions (mainly within recipient countries like Japan) and the experiences of former irregular Filipino migrants in normalizing their status. The paper briefly illustrates the significant role played by the state and non-state actors in helping the migrants overcome their problems, while it also describes the effects of the actions of other individuals (human agency) in expediting or hindering the regularization of their status as residents of Japan.

Profiling Filipino Migration in Japan

Many scholars have indicated that hapless migrants, even at the very beginning of their journey from the Philippines, are seen as “cash cows.” They have to shell out a large sum of money to get a job abroad through the “super-migration industry” of the recruitment agencies and/or the government’s employment office—POEA (Asis 2008; Tyner 2009). When they reach and begin working abroad, they are repeatedly extracted money for family remittances sent back home.

As early as the 1990s, industries were desperate to accept illegal foreign workers to fill the vacant jobs for manual laborers. Firms and employers are dependent on their labor for the 3D¹ jobs that the local workers shun (see also Iguchi 1998; Debrah 2002; Portes and De Wind 2007). These employers include those in the booming entertainment industry that appears in the life stories of the informants in this paper. This presents a relatively common image of a disadvantaged group of “unskilled and temporary” foreign workers in Japan—the new entertainers.² Unskilled migrants, at the onset of their journeys, begin with practically nothing: Low-skilled and less educated, with less work experience and little or no employment training, putting them at a disadvantage when it comes to competing in the labor market. The sense of “temporariness” pushes migrants to the edge of insecurity, and thus increases their vulnerability. This is common for those who entered Japan as entertainers (*Japayuki-san*) or those who are doing “nightwork” (Allison 1994).

On the other hand, earlier reports by the Hong Kong-based Asia-Pacific Mission for Migrants (APMM 2004) revealed that there were several instances of undocumented workers locked up in jail. There are also many other distressed migrants who cannot even be located due to the failure in monitoring their cases. As a matter of fact, non-government advocacy groups have constantly assailed the Philippine government's passive stance on cases involving *migrants in distress* in spite of the reality that it is one of the major beneficiaries of foreign currency earnings from the migrants. It must be noted that a substantial number of these migrants are women who are very vulnerable to abuse, rape and other forms of violence.

In Japan, most detained OFWs—a big number of whom are women—are incarcerated due to overstaying, expired visas, or illegal entry. Up until the middle of 2004, about 100,000 Filipinas were deployed annually to this country. The Japanese government then imposed a more stringent immigration policy specifically aimed at the growing dependence on foreign labor and the issue of human trafficking. It is well-known that most potential migrants from Southeast Asia, especially the Philippines, enter Japan with entertainer or tourist visas and later take on other jobs illegally (Ball and Piper 2002). This has been common for decades, coupled with the mushrooming of the migration industry that is able to import would-be migrants from any part of the globe outside the usual bounds of legal process (Kleinschmidt 2006).

Despite the official policy that migrants must return home when their visa expires as in the case of the “guestworkers” in Germany in the 1970s, many migrants in Japan opt to extend their stay often beyond the validity of their visa. Shimada (1994) further notes that some of them “remained, married, and had children, or had their families join them,” gradually increasing their numbers. In the event that they are caught, they brought their cases to the courts. Luckily, some of them managed to legalize their status by obtaining temporary or permanent visas primarily because of their children and/or family members who have already established themselves in the country.

Not all irregular migrants have luckily escaped this predicament. An investigation of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) exposed a gruesome picture of the authorities' mistreatment of suspected illegal immigrants (Hsu 2007). The report further shows that, while illegal immigrants are supposedly held on administrative grounds, the state and local correctional authorities—unaware of the United States standards for detained migrants—often house them together with criminals. Similarly, as early as the 1990s, Japan had been particularly concerned with “mono-ethnic” oriented Japanese immigration policies and the growing criminalization of irregular migration by the media and the National Police Agency (NPA). Komai (1995) and Herbert (1996) describe the “xenophobic tendencies” or anti-immigrant sentiments of recipient countries' policies against foreign workers, evidently designed to criminalize irregular migrants. Other scholars have shown how the concept of national security has been juxtaposed with that of a “society's security.” Migration, in this sense, is linked to domestic crime, or is seen as a threat to national security. Hence, punitive actions against “irregulars” are justified to overcome this “threat,” and the government is given extraordinary powers to resolve this “problem” including detention and/or deportation (Arifianto 2009).

In this light, Solimano's (2010, 43) definition of “criminal illegals” somehow mirrors the kind of perception that Japan has, as a host country, of the so-called irregulars. He refers to undocumented and/or unauthorized migrants as “illegal migrants” as opposed to mere “overstayers,” whom he calls “irregular migrants.” When irregular migrants are perceived as “illegal migrants” engaging in “criminal and unlawful activities” and whose “offense goes beyond immigration laws” (Solimano 2010), then it is highly likely that anti-immigration sentiment in the host society is exacerbated. This phenomenon is usually aggravated by distorted and selective crime reporting by the media, with headlines that stereotype foreign suspects as criminals of the worst kind. Filipinos appear in newspaper stories and are depicted in ways similar to the informants' experiences in this paper. Such prejudiced reporting shows all Filipinos in a bad light and labels them as “dangerous” (Herbert 1996, 284; Shipper 2008).

Contrary to the usual negative public perception, most irregular migrants would avoid committing common crimes as they are fully aware of the risks of arrest or incarceration. An “illegal migrant” has to cope with hostile public opinion, as well as that of the Japanese police authorities. Herbert (1996, 245) outlines the “illegality stigma” that migrants suffer from, made worse by the Japanese police’s “labeling” practices after arrest, lack of legal counsel for foreign suspects, and the “pre-definition” of foreign suspects as “violators of the law.” Herbert also shows the bias in decisions of the courts against foreign suspects even in cases involving petty crimes. This is evident in the early stage of deciding whether or not to prosecute them for indictment and sentencing practices. Even the interpreters for suspects with limited facility for the Japanese language tend to predefine interrogated suspects as “criminal and guilty.” The tendency to perceive migrants as criminals has recently been mitigated by Japan’s internationalization policies at the national and local levels, as demonstrated by the provision of health care services, and access to educational facilities extended to irregular migrants and their families. Yet, such unfair notion about foreign migrants is still employed to justify the state’s reduction of migration into a security issue, thereby ensuring the state’s role to protect public safety (Herbert 1996; Shipper 2008).

The Five Cases

The unit of analysis of this study is the specific phenomenon of the outcome and consequences of irregular migration which typically include migrants’ arrest, detention and deportation. Data were primarily collected through in-depth interviews (IDI) of case informants. Access to them was sought through the help of non-government organizations (NGOs) and through referrals and snowball sampling. The responses of the case informants were validated through key-informant interviews (KIIs) with NGOs that handled their cases, and from documentary analysis of secondary sources (especially in relation to policy measures and recommendations). This article is a preliminary analysis of these particular cases, and thus cannot be seen as

representing the experiences of all irregular migrants, either in Japan or in other countries.

Before proceeding to the main body of this paper, let us first provide the operational definitions of some keywords. “Irregular migration” in this context describes migrants who “enter or remain in a country of which they are not a citizen, in breach of its national laws” (Marshall 2006). Other terms for irregular migration are illegal, unauthorized, and undocumented migration.³ Marshall includes, in her definition of this term, migrants who enter or remain in a country without authorization; those who are smuggled or trafficked; unsuccessful asylum-seekers, and actors “who circumvent immigration controls,” for example, through imitation or sham marriages or fake adoptions.⁴ This paper focuses on those who circumvented immigration controls and unauthorized migrants, that is, overstaying migrants. Furthermore, “migrants” in this paper refers to unskilled/low-skilled temporary or contract migrant workers (*dekasegi* in Japanese) or those considered “non-permanent residents” as opposed to immigrants who aim for permanent settlement.

Below are the five life stories of irregular Filipino migrants in Japan:

Case 1: An entertainer, jailed for overstaying twice and then obtained a temporary visa after granted pardon:

Irene was forced by circumstances to look for a way to earn a living when her eldest sister got married and left her to bear the family responsibilities.⁵ She worked in a local snack bar and was later “discovered” by a recruiter. She was introduced to a Japanese omise (club) owner and after two weeks, she was able to enter Japan as an “entertainer” with a fake Philippine passport. In 1999 her boss ran into problems running the business. Together with six other “talent girls” who had no legal documents, she was caught by the police and then deported. Back home, life seemed to return to “normalcy” but a tougher ordeal lay ahead when she became pregnant. She had to work harder to support her family. Worse, her younger sister got pregnant as well. Later, she decided to apply again for Japan through “legal” means but because this process took a long time and because she was desperate to leave to find a better life, she resorted to an illegal but faster way.

She came back to Japan in 2001 with an illegal passport. For two and a half years, she worked as hostess until she decided to run away due to her “bad” mamasan (the boss in the omise). She moved from one city to another taking “3D” jobs and arubaito or paato (part-time jobs).⁶ She was arrested a second time in 2008, and was sentenced to eighteen months in jail as a repeat offender (recidivist). In 2009, she was granted parole mainly because of her good behavior. While incarcerated, she gave birth to a son by a Japanese boyfriend. Having to work as a hostess at night, she had to hire someone to take care of her child. Her son is sick (the cause is unknown) and is currently cared for in a government facility. Through the assistance of a Filipino NGO in her city, Irene in the end received a temporary visa a year after she was released from jail. She is now an on-call volunteer working for the same NGO.

Case 2: A female entertainer with a child by a jailed Japanese “salaryman:”

Rose came to Japan in 2003 as a “talent” (used in Japan to refer to entertainers who are under contract), with a fake Philippine passport. Six months later, she met her would-be husband, a forty-two-year-old regular customer in the club where she worked. Rose was twenty years old then. Due to the strict regulations in the omise, she decided to escape from her shachou (boss) with the assurance of help from her would-be husband. Two years later, they had a son. However, they could not marry because her boyfriend was still legally married to a Japanese woman who refused to divorce him. Since her partner did not want her to work at all and that Rose had to support her family back home, the man was forced to work double time.

Unfortunately, Rose’s boyfriend was found guilty of embezzlement of company funds and was sentenced to five years in prison. The police interrogated her as well and discovered her irregular immigration status. She was detained at a police station for six weeks, and another six weeks in an immigration detention facility (three months in total). She said it was the most traumatic time of her life since she had to be separated from her child. Her son had to be taken care of by a government-run shelter. While incarcerated, her friends and some NGO volunteers helped her obtain special permission to stay in Japan, and then later a temporary visa.

Ever since then, she has been active in helping Filipino irregulars and was recently elected as one of the officers of a Filipino NGO in her city.

Case 3: An irregular migrant woman, divorced from a Japanese husband, bore a child by another Japanese man who was jailed for involvement in organized crime:

Venice started working as a hostess in an omise owned by a Japanese businessman married to a Filipina wife. She was just twenty-one years old when she came to Japan for the first time in 2005, the year of a massive crackdown on illegal foreigners or, to use the politically correct term, “overstayers.” When her entertainer’s visa was not renewed, she was forced to marry a Japanese man that she did not love. (She used the term “imitation marriage” to distinguish her situation from that of a “fake marriage”). Venice later met another Japanese man who became the father of her daughter. She divorced her first husband and lived with the second man. She said her first husband pleaded for her and offered her everything but she declined, saying she had no affection for him. She loved her second partner who was later jailed (for a third time) after being found guilty on a criminal charge related to selling a stolen luxury car.

When her child became seriously ill, she was left alone. An undocumented migrant cannot take out health insurance given that its prerequisite is a valid visa. Luckily, a Japanese friend of her second partner offered help. She planned on going back to the Philippines but she was invited to a migration conference and met some NGO workers. A lawyer advised her to appeal her case to the courts on the basis of the possibility that a Japanese citizenship could be granted to her daughter. Later, with the help from a Filipino NGO, the local government provided her with free accommodation at a shelter, pending the decision on her status from the immigration office.

Case 4: An irregular migrant for twenty years who has a child and a Filipina wife:

Jack first came to Japan as a hosto (male entertainer). He had worked as a bellboy in a hotel in Saudi Arabia but was drawn toward the bubble economy of Japan in the 1990s. Since he “had the looks” then, he made use

of this. However, when his visa expired, he overstayed and started working in a factory. A few years later, he met a Filipina and cohabited with her until she became pregnant and delivered their baby. (They later got married after he was detained and obtained his special residence permission.) His girlfriend was also an irregular Filipino migrant. For two decades, they evaded authorities with some degree of invisibility. Their “non-citizenship status” (Chung 2010) did not prevent Jack’s family from integrating with Filipinos and Filipino organizations actively promoting their welfare in the city. In fact, his family availed of the primary education program provided by a local NGO-church partnership that extends support even to children of unmarried and illegal parents.

These linkages paid off when Jack was arrested in 2008 by immigration agents posing as Japanese hostesses. Upon interrogation, he refused to reveal his family’s exact address, something that he promised to himself before. He was detained for three months in an immigration detention facility. Soon after, his wife surrendered to the immigration office as well. With the help of a Filipino-Japanese NGO consortium and a legal assistance group, Jack pressed for his family’s case. Later, both were granted temporary visas in view of the fact that their thirteen-year-old daughter had been in Japan since birth. He is now helping the NGO on a voluntary basis when a need arises.

Case 5: A Filipino family in which both parents were jailed and charged for overstaying, and later helped by their eldest daughter:

Patricia came to Japan eighteen years ago with an entertainer’s visa. She met Sonny who worked as a waiter in the same omise. Sonny pursued her until they became secret lovers. Due to the objection of their shachou to their relationship, they quit their work and eventually overstayed their visas. They started doing odd jobs, moving from one type of 3D work to another. They now have three daughters. Undercover immigration agents apprehended Patricia after a personal quarrel with a Japanese who reported her to the authorities. Later, she was detained for three months.

Patricia got assistance from various welfare networks and from a city-based Philippine NGO that provided her with legal advice and other

services. Her eldest daughter was her greatest support. By writing letters to her Japanese teachers (she was a Junior high school student at that time) and to some of the officers and members of her school's Parents-Teachers Association (PTA), the family somehow swayed the immigration office. In the end, these people helped Patricia obtain special permission to remain in Japan. Her partner, Sonny, later on surrendered to the authorities. He was detained for about two months in an immigration detention facility. This time, Patricia helped him to get out, and eventually regularized his status by marrying him. Patricia's case is a classic example of a survival strategy that made use of a combination of various networks to press for her case. Together with her husband, she is now an on-call NGO volunteer.

Analysis and Discussion

State power versus human rights

In 2009, the Calderon family's six-month legal battle concluded with a decision from Japan's Justice Minister Eisuke Mori, granting thirteen-year-old Noriko a one-year special permit to stay with her aunt and continue her studies. Her Filipino parents, however, who came to Japan in the 1990s on fake passports, were deported (McNeill 2009). The case of the Calderon family was a test of Japan's rigid immigration law, which strictly prohibits unauthorized migrants from entering the country. Earlier in 2008, a slightly similar case challenged Japan's citizenship law. A landmark ruling was delivered by Japan's Supreme Court in favor of ten Japanese-Filipino children (JFC), aged between eight and fourteen, who were born out of wedlock, granting them Japanese citizenship. The high court declared unconstitutional certain provisions in the Japanese Nationality Law, which state that children born of foreign (Filipino) mothers and Japanese fathers out of wedlock can only follow the mother's citizenship. The ruling also explained that these provisions violate Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution which requires "equality under the law" (Balana 2008), paving the way for the amendment of the present nationality law.

The stories above starkly illustrate Japan's "dualistic" response to dealing with irregular migrants given its rigid and strict sense of identity and statehood, pivoting on the issues of citizenship and immigration. The JFC case seems to show a more liberal leaning decision toward respect for human rights which is quite opposite to that of the Calderons. As Steiner (2009) and Joppke (2010) have shown, the debates on citizenship have become "infused with that of human rights." Such arguments touch on the moral obligation of modern liberal democratic states toward migrants, if not aliens in general. Policies that tend to be racist, sexist or exclusionist toward immigrants are regarded as illegitimate and/or run the risk of being branded as violating human rights (Joppke 2010). Thus, the "liberal paradox" turns out to be a good description of a situation in which governments have to contend with the balancing act of conforming to international conventions on the one hand, and maintaining sovereignty and/or state security on the other (Hollifield 2000; Koser 2007). While liberal states are largely prevented by their own national constitutions that favor individuals rights (Ellerman 2010), civil society groups, professionals, and lower levels of government (local/state level) play a significant role in opposing national policies and their implementation (including immigration law) (Leerkes and Broeders 2010). Portes and De Wind (2007, 7) have elaborated on these continuing contradictions:

By and large, the wealthy receiving nations are also democracies where human rights legislation applies to all those within their borders, not just citizens, preventing state attempts to deal summarily with unwelcome newcomers... [States are] prevented by their own laws (constitutions) from effectively controlling or suppressing unwanted immigration (see also Castles 2007).

Case informants shared common stories of undocumented status, evading arrest by the authorities (ranging from eight to twenty years), and being incarcerated at a police station or immigration detention center. One informant (Jack, Case 4) revealed being shouted at by police when he was apprehended and being called names such as *baka* (idiot or stupid) when he refused to answer some questions. The informants agreed that the worst scenario for an irregular migrant caught by authorities is during the interrogation at the police station. They admitted that a *bilog*⁸ (irregular Filipino migrant) is

lucky if he/she is arrested by immigration agents rather than by the police. In the Japanese Criminal Procedure Rules (CPR), the police can legally detain an accused for twenty-three days before an indictment is made (without charges or access to a legal counsel). Japanese bar associations and other human rights groups had earlier called for the abolition of this procedure, which is contrary to the United Nations standards (Ibusuki 2009). Ibusuki (2009, 2) further notes:

[The rules] give the police three days before sending the case to the prosecutor's office, and permit the prosecutors to detain the defendant for twenty days before their decision to prosecute based on authorization by the court. For a total of twenty-three days the accused can be legally held in a police detention cell or *dai-yo kangoku* (substitute prison). Although the United Nations Human Right Commission repeatedly criticized this rule and practice, the Japanese government has not changed the law.

Moreover, other respondents noted that although Japanese authorities wanted to speed up the process of the irregular migrants' deportation, some law enforcers handled their cases fairly (on a case-to-case basis). They took into account the fact that the migrants have established themselves in the country for quite some time, brought their families, married nationals, or had children by a Japanese father. Article 50 of Japan's Immigration Control Act (ICA) calls this procedure as granting "special permission of residence" which is to be decided by Japan's MOJ, following a comprehensive appraisal that weighs all the relevant circumstance for each individual case (Immigration Bureau-MOJ 2009). Sampson, Mitchell and Bowring (2011, 12) call these processes as "alternatives to immigration detention," defined as "any legislation, policy or practice that allows for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants to reside in the community with freedom of movement while their migration status is being resolved or awaiting deportation or removal from the country." With this mechanism in place, the state itself has given the migrants a chance to negotiate their status, moving from being illegal migrants to partial citizens. As such, migrants are subtly made to adapt to the dominant host society including integration and/or incorporation (Ball and Piper 2002).

Negotiating status and partial citizenship

Describing the “stunted integration” of Filipina domestic workers in their host countries, Parreñas (2001) calls this phenomenon “partial citizenship” in which Filipinas provide care for these countries’ citizens at the expense of their own rights. Kajita (1998, 123) defines incorporation as a way of “accepting foreigners” in the broadest sense, which involves being absorbed and integrated in the host society. Meanwhile, Lacroix (2010) suggests two other definitions of integration: 1) A one-way process of adaptation by newcomers, and 2) a two-way process of adaptation involving changes in values, norms and behavior for both the newcomers and the host society. Lacroix (2010) further explains that incorporation could be a much broader term, which denotes becoming part of a polity, that is, gaining rights and privileges including citizenship. In any case, defining integration and incorporation is dependent on the kind of policy goals and strategic objectives that the state has for migrants. This is, however, a sensitive issue for countries such as Japan.

Japan is a recent country of immigration, particularly illegal migration. The US Trafficking of Persons Report in 2004-2005 describes Japan as a “destination country for a large number of Asian, Latin American, and Eastern European women and children who are trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation” (Fujimoto 2006, 1). This led the government to immediately reduce the number of issued entertainers’ visa.

Further, with its nascent liberal ideals, Japan has been particularly conscious of its adherence to international obligations and conventions as well as its international image. It is a signatory to most conventions on human rights including the Children’s Rights Convention (CRC), the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), among many others. The country’s adherence to these international agreements has played a significant role in extending selected citizenship rights to some migrants, including children and their mothers or parents (Stasiulis and Bakan 2003; Joppke 2010).

Recently, the notion of citizenship has been incorporated into the discourse on the politics of migration. Most countries in the world follow one of the two principles of citizenship law: The descent-based *jus sanguinis* determined by the parents' nationality, or the territorial *jus soli* determined by the country of birth (Joppke 2010). A few countries such as France and later Germany have modified their rules, mixing these two major legal practices. Japan is following the *bilineal* *jus sanguinis* (Kondo 2001) model to emphasize the present nationality law by birth, which can be acquired from either parent. However, the *jus soli* principle is applied in cases where both parents of the child acquiring citizenship are unknown, thereby making them stateless children. In 2008, the Japanese government passed a bill granting citizenship to children born to foreign women and Japanese men out of wedlock. Given these developments, although policymakers do not admit it, Japan's "reclusive immigration policy" with its contradictions between immigration and citizenship policies has moved away from its earlier inflexible stance to a more considerate form of migration management.

Indispensable role of non-state actors

The case of Filipino irregulars is just one of the diverse issues surrounding the fragile relationship between the state and individuals. In issues involving power versus rights, it is the state that can readily muster its vast resources to protect its own agenda. Hence, non-state actors have to intervene to advance the interests of disadvantaged individuals, particularly irregular migrants. These organizations also play an indispensable role in various occasions particularly by offering policy recommendations to pertinent institutions, government agencies and/or those in authority.

Furthermore, immigration issue can be an important electoral matter in many parts of the world. In Europe, particularly in France and Germany, this has been one of the popular campaigns by far-right populist parties against the social democrats and the left-block. In Singapore and Malaysia, the campaign against illegal immigrants from neighboring countries is a driving force for some political parties to gain electoral votes. Yet, it is also undeniable that active information drives and countermands-advocacy campaigns of non-

state actors and organizations have resulted in the isolation of these ultra-rightist elements in the government. The shift in the electoral support against anti-immigrant sentiments is clearly evident in Greece, and recently in the electoral fallout for Sarkozy in France.

In the US, President Barack Obama issued his new directives for immigration during his reelection campaign calling for “deferred action” on illegal migration, thereby, offering children of irregular migrants a chance to regularize their status through reprieve from deportation or an issuance of a work permit/employment authorization. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) admits that the directive is not an amnesty or a new track to citizenship. It is rather a “temporary fix and if there is a change of administration, there is a possibility that the program will be changed or abandoned” (Tancinco 2012, 2). Nevertheless, the case of Jose Librojo who is an undocumented Filipino in the US is a good example of the significant position played by non-state actors in helping disadvantaged irregular migrants. Librojo was about to be deported but thousands signed online petitions and many others called the attention of the President and some supportive Senators who in return sent letters in support of Librojo to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office. The ICE eventually halted his deportation orders. The National Alliance for Filipino Concerns (NAFCON) had been particularly instrumental in paving the way for a change of his status (Rueda 2011).

In Japan, Migrante International and Philippine NGOs (more of ‘self-help groups’) such as the Filipino Migrants Center (FMC) have been very active in providing assistance for irregular immigrants alike. Most of this takes the form of legal advice on immigration and labor issues, as well as on welfare concerns of the irregular immigrants’ children. Additionally, informants above pointed out the significant role played by personnel at an immigration office who understood their cases, and informal connections through Japanese members of PTAs, among others. Japanese advocacy groups and sympathetic individuals alike also offer migrants in distress an avenue to air their grievances against the human rights abuses perpetrated against them or even in the provision of health services and legal assistance.

The migration institutions as applied in the context of irregular migration include a wide array of state agencies, employers, recruitment industries, non-government bodies, and even individual actors who contribute to the welfare of people on the move. This is reflected in the cases above in the same manner as Shipper (2008) describes the role of Japanese NGOs for immigrant rights (serving both regular and irregular migrants) as “associative activism.” Shipper (2008, 11) explains this concept:

Local actors seek to transform inflexible and relatively unresponsive political institutions through coordinated local activities aimed at resolving a particular problem that, while not directly conflicting with prevailing government policies, nonetheless challenges the broader political status quo. I consider activism to be associative when 1) like-minded activists form a range of NGOs to address specific problems and 2) local governments increasingly cooperate with activists and their organizations, forming novel and flexible institutions.

Conclusion

The temporary status of migrants contributes to their sense of insecurity, which is further heightened by their “unwantedness” from mainstream society. For irregular migrants, being legally recognized is just one step to reduce the stigma of being an outsider. In the eyes of a citizen, a migrant is often a non-citizen (or worse, a potentially dangerous criminal). The case studies presented in this paper show that an insecure irregular migrant will certainly seek recognition, not necessarily from mainstream society but from peers, networks, and most of the time from compatriots to establish links and build contacts. Shipper (2008, 59) clarifies this “recognition-seeking-process:”

Living in a country with no active policies to fully incorporate foreigners into its society, such foreigners in Japan with no political rights inevitably feel vulnerable as outsiders and turn to building closer ties with their co-ethnics and their home countries. As a result, they have created numerous immigrant ethnic associations, groups that provide ethnic identification and

various kinds of support for legal foreigners, although generally not for their illegal compatriots.

Irregular migrants cannot stay “invisible” for long while evading arrest and detention. Eventually, they have to ask somebody on how to go to the hospital when they become ill or on how to send their children to school. Many of them hope that someday they can negotiate their status as “human beings,” though with limited participation in politics. Irregular migrants volunteer to work for non-state organizations working for migrants’ concerns particularly when these organizations also help them appeal their cases to the immigration authorities to obtain special residence permission, and also when their own governments fail to help them (Piper 2004).

In this process, obtaining a “legal status” is only the first step. It must be stressed that these people are not just labor or economic migrants. They are human beings accorded with rights. Human rights advocates say that recipient societies do not merely get workers but instead people (Cornelius 1994; Steiner 2009). As these migrants communicate and socialize with others, they will miss their own families back home. Loneliness drives them to establish a family of their own in their host society, or they bring their own families to live with them.

Scholars have shown the inevitability of foreign workers, including irregular migrants, to settle permanently in Japan. However, Shimada (1994) suggests an alternative which combines closing the door to foreign labor imports and reducing dependence on foreign workers along with becoming more open to “integration” for the remaining migrants. Weiner and Hanami (1998) have projected that Japan would open up and adopt more multicultural policies. Today, a “dual scenario” exists in which a strict national immigration policy is being juxtaposed at the local level with local citizenship integration programs. For instance, cities and prefectural governments initiate activities promoting the multicultural coexistence of Japanese citizens with foreigners under the banner of an “internationalization” policy. Recent developments, however, reveal a contrary picture. In July of 2012, the MOJ implemented the 2009 amended Japanese Immigration Control Act⁹ which emphasizes

new “residency management system” targeting “illegal residents” through centralized information gathering. While irregular migrants can be registered under the old alien registration system, they cannot be registered under the new system (MOJ 2012). With this new system, Japanese society is fortified inwardly from undocumented non-citizens.

The immigration case of Japan is somehow unique compared to most other recent countries of destination. The blending of liberal principles, respect for conventions, recognition of non-state entities, and local immigration initiatives, coupled with a higher demand for unskilled workers from Japanese employers, make it impossible for Japan to pursue an ultra-rightist conservative anti-migration policy. While Japan is apparently leaning toward more state power over individual or migrants’ rights, it sees migration as constantly changing rather than a permanent phenomenon. Its government is conscious of the fact that it has to gradually adapt to the growing demand for international interdependence. Rigidity will only lead to more failures, if not unintended outcomes, of these policies. In the final analysis, host countries with declining populations like Japan will have to reconsider their immigration policies. As Portes and De Wind (2007, 7) argue:

Redoubling border enforcement compels migrant laborers to abandon their previous pattern of circular migration, encouraging them instead to settle in the host country and bring their families. Instead of stopping migration, these “get tough” policies end up consolidating migrants’ presence and further entrenching their support networks.

Notes

¹ 3D is derived from the Japanese expression pertaining to 3K jobs: *Kitsui* (demanding), *kitanai* (dirty), *kiken* (dangerous) (Koshiro 1998; Weiner 1998).

² Tyner (2009) sees temporary migrants as “those persons whose stay overseas for employment-related purposes, and who are expected to return at the end of their work contract.” The papers of Suzuki and Takahata (2007) and Suzuki (2008) argue that historically (old) entertainers who came earlier were highly respected as “professional performers” (musical and boxers-athletic). In addition, Ball and Piper (2002) note that an entertainer’s visa is in fact signified under the “skilled” category.

³ Aguilar (2011) asserts that using the term “illegal” is inappropriate since it serves to criminalize migrants when their transgressions are supposedly considered “administrative and not criminal in nature.” The term “undocumented” is an ambiguous term such that many of the irregular migrants are documented, possessing passports and/or travel document (Koser 2007).

⁴ According to Tyner (2009), irregular migrants are “those not properly documented or without valid residence or work permits, or who are overstaying in a foreign country.”

⁵ The names of all case study respondents are withheld with anonymity for privacy and confidentiality reasons vis-à-vis rights of the interviewees.

⁶ Wakisaka and Bae (1998) refer to *arubaito* as “student part-timers,” while *paato* is the more appropriate term for “part-time workers.” Recently, *arubaito* or just simply *baito* becomes a common usage to describe these jobs.

⁷ Strict immigration rules in Japan had led to a drop in deployment of Filipina entertainers from 80,000 in 2005 to 7,000 in 2007 (Kanlungan 2008).

⁸ Many NGOs named irregular Filipino migrants in Japan as *bilog* (circle) denoting “zero” or no status.

⁹ Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA), or the “Immigration Control Act,” has been amended several times.

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The Water-Energy Nexus: Exploring Options for Davao's Future

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ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the impending water and energy crisis in Davao City. Three statistical models namely linear, exponential, and cubic were used to predict future water and energy demands. The Tamugan River offers a potential source to address this looming problem, yet, it has become a source of conflict mainly between the Davao City Water District and Hedcor, Inc. The former is bent on harnessing the river which is known to have an abundance of high-quality surface water, while the latter proposes to establish cascaded hydropower plants given the river's immense volume of flowing water. Notwithstanding the sincerity of both parties, the current conflict on who should harness the Tamugan River and how it be harnessed has to be resolved to avoid forestalling Davao City's development.

KEYWORDS: Water, energy, Mindanao grid, Davao grid, Tamugan, Talomo, Lipadas

Introduction

Population growth and economic development have pushed the demand for all forms of resources especially water and energy (Scott et al. 2011; Voinov and Cardwell 2009). The interlink between water and energy needs to be conscientiously looked into as it has a lot of implications for the environment and communities. Water is needed to process and generate energy (Rio Carillo and Frei 2009) while energy is a requirement to extract, treat, and distribute water (Siddiqi and Anadon 2011).

Davao City is purportedly the second largest city in the world, and is situated at the southeastern part of Mindanao, Philippines. There are eight overlapping watersheds flowing into the city and the gulf of Davao (Hearne et al. 2008). Its population in the year 2000 registered at 1,147,116 and is growing at a rate of 2.41 percent annually (National Statistics Coordinating Board [NSCB] 2009a). With the increasing population, more houses, commercial and industrial buildings have been built. Hence, the demand for water and energy has also accelerated.

The watershed of Tamugan River, found to have the highest quality of water (Class AA), is viewed as a potential source to address this increasing demand. The said river, however, has become a source of conflict as to whether it should be used to generate energy or used as a water source. Two organizations, namely Hedcor, Inc., a private developer of run-of-river hydropower plants, and the Davao City Water District (DCWD), a semi-government water utility company, are engaged in this tug-of-war. The former plans to install a set of hydropower plants at the Tamugan River while the latter also intends to use the same river as a source of water for distribution to the people of Davao City. Until 2009, DCWD has ownership rights over the area, but thereafter questions as to who has the right to use the river remains unsettled.

The study was conducted to determine the state of water and power and their interlink in Davao City. Three statistical models, namely linear, exponential, and cubic were employed to predict future water and energy demands. Data published by the Department of Energy (DOE) and DCWD were used in developing the models of these demands. Data obtained from the Davao City government, NSCB, and the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP), previously named as Transmission Corporation of the Philippines (TRANSCO), were also used in the analyses.

Framework

Generally, water and energy are interdependent on each other. Water is needed to process and produce energy while energy is required to extract and dispose water. Both resources are crucial to the population and economic growth.

Water extracted from the Dumoy water wells through the use of multiple pumps are directly fed by the DCWD to the residential, commercial and industrial buildings, and other agricultural and manufacturing establishments in the Davao City area. Meanwhile, the NGCP is responsible for feeding the energy produced by the power plants installed at various locations in Mindanao to specific areas. In Davao City, the Davao Light and Power Company (DLPC) distributes electricity to the end users, such as the DCWD which uses the energy in extracting water.

With population growth and improved economic mobility, the supply of water and power is potentially imperiled and could be surpassed by demand. Tamugan River is viewed as a potent source for either water supply (through DCWD) or power generation (via Hedcor, Inc.) or both, providing an option to address the impending water and energy crises. See Figure 1 for the framework used in the study.




FIGURE 1: Water-energy nexus framework.

On the one hand, Hedcor, Inc. is the largest private developer of run-of-river hydropower plants in the Philippines. It owns and operates fifteen hydropower facilities in Benguet and Davao, with a total capacity of 38.22 MW. Presently, it is working on the 42.50 MW hydropower plant at Sibulan, Davao del Sur. It has developed and constructed twelve mini-hydropower plants within a span of ten years. To increase its hydropower portfolio, Hedcor, Inc. is proposing to develop a 27.5 MW hydropower system at the Tamugan and Panigan rivers. On the other hand, DCWD is a semi-government company that distributes potable water to the people of Davao City for drinking and other purposes. DCWD operates water pumps at the Dumoy area to extract water through its water wells. From 1977 to 1992, forty three water wells were drilled and thirty of these were free-flowing (Lotti 1982). About 90 percent of water distributed by DCWD comes from groundwater sources or the Dumoy aquifer. To increase water production, DCWD plans to use both the Tamugan and Lipadas rivers for water distribution (see Appendix 1). In May of 1997, the National Water Resource Board (NWRB) granted DCWD permit to use water from Tamugan River with the diversion point at Upper Baguio, in Baguio District.

Methodology

The data on water profile and relevant parameters provided by DCWD, data on the state of energy in Mindanao obtained from the DOE and TRANSCO, and the proposal of Hedcor, Inc. to install hydropower plants at Tamugan River were used in the analyses. These data were respectively presented during a roundtable discussion at the Ateneo de Davao University (ADDU) in 2009. Three statistical models namely, linear, exponential, and cubic were used to predict which best fits future water and energy demands.

The linear model can be described by the equation of a straight line $y = mx + b$. Where y (vertical axis) here is the dependent variable representing MW (megawatt) for power and MLD (million liters per day) for water; the m refers to the slope of the line (0° to 360°); the x (horizontal axis) which represents the year; and, b (the y-intercept) is the initial y-value (in MW

or MLD) of the model. If the R^2 of the linear model for the actual data set is about 0.90 to 0.99, the modelled data set resembles the actual data set. Meanwhile, the exponential model is defined by the curve function (concave up) $y = ab^x$. Here y and x represents the vertical (MW or MLD) and horizontal axes (year), respectively. The a here should be greater than 0 ($a > 0$) and b can be of any value. Again the higher the value of R^2 , the higher the reliability of the modelled data set. Finally, the cubic model is a polynomial model with a degree 3 which can be defined by a function $y = ax^3 + bx^2 + cx + d$. Again the y and the x values are the vertical (MW or MLD) and horizontal (year) values. Note, however, that the highest degree of the first term is 3 (ax^3). This would mean that the data set is expected to curve up and to curve down once for all the data in a set. Similar with the linear and the exponential models, the ideal value for R^2 is 1.00 to suitably represent the actual data set.




FIGURE 2: Three statistical models namely, a) linear, b) exponential, and c) cubic.

Results and Discussion

Water is a critical natural resource, and its existence depends largely on how it is being used and how the watershed surrounding it is being protected. With non-existing or limited government policies, and weak law enforcement in managing and protecting the watershed, water quality and quantity may be imperiled (Scott et al. 2011). In Mindanao, water is also being used for power generation. There are other water sources outside Davao City, but the interest to set up both water plants and power plants are centered in the Tamugan River. To understand the water-energy nexus situation in Davao City, the succeeding sections present the facts on water, power generation,

the use of Tamugan River, and the identified points of conflict between Hedcor, Inc. and DCWD.

Water

Davao is one of the most progressive cities in the Philippines. In 2000, it registered a population of 1,147,116. Population is growing at a soaring rate of 2.41 percent annually (NSCB 2009a). However, as reported by NSCB (2009b), economic mobility in Davao region slowed down in 2009. With the growing population and rapid establishment of residential, commercial and industrial infrastructures, Davao City is confronted with a substantial demand for resources, especially water and energy. It is considered by the NWRB (1998) as one of the nine water-critical urbanized areas in the Philippines with exhaustive consumption of water (see Table 1). Davao City's exploitable groundwater is 84 million cubic per meter (MC) per year; water demand by 2025 is projected to reach 153 MCM per year as compared to 50 MCM per year in 1995.

TABLE I. Water demand and groundwater potential in selected nine major urban areas

Major City	Exploitable Groundwater (MCM ¹ / year)	Water Demand (MCM/year)		Ratio of Demand in 2025 to Demand in 1995
		1995	2025	
Metro Manila	191	1,068	2,883	2.7
Metro Cebu	60	59	342	5.8
Davao City	84	50	153	3.1
Baguio City	15	12	87	7.3
Angeles City	137	11	31	2.8
Bacolod City	103	37	111	3.0
Iloilo City	80	9	47	5.2
Cagayan de Oro City	34	29	98	3.4
Zamboanga City	54	28	203	7.3

Source: NWRB 1998, ¹Million cubic meters (MCM)

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) of Region XI and the World Bank (WB) commissioned Asia-Geodyne Corporation to conduct a study to determine the residual volume of groundwater in the Talomo-Lipadas watershed (DCWD 2009). The result of the study showed that the demand for water will most likely surpass supply starting 2011 onwards (see Table 2). Aside from the increasing demand, DCWD (2009) claimed that nine of the water wells in barangay Dumoy already experienced a 3.5-meter drop. This would entail significant reduction in the production of water from the nine water wells. This is a condition that is quite common in China where the water table in some areas was reduced by about 30-35 meters in just thirty years (Voinov and Cardwell 2009). At a decreased water table, saltwater intrusion may happen and may affect the fresh water aquifers, thus affecting the overall quality of water supply (Palanca-Tan and Bautista 2009). In the case of Davao City, the situation may lead us to believe that there is a high possibility of saltwater intrusion into the Dumoy water wells in the coming years.

TABLE 2. Projected residual volume of groundwater in the Talomo-Lipadas watershed

Year	GWR ¹ (MLD)	GWU ² (MLD)	Residual (MLD ³)
1997	280.5	134.61	145.8
2001	280.5	163.68	116.82
2005	280.5	199.03	81.47
2009	280.5	242.03	38.47
2011	280.5	280.50	0.00
2013	280.5	294.30	-13.80
2017	280.5	357.87	-77.37

Source: Asia-Geodyne Corp. in DCWD 2009


¹Groundwater reserved (GWR), ²Groundwater used (GWU), ³Million liters per day (MLD)

To determine the production of water in the future, with reference to the Asia-Geodyne Corporation data, three statistical models were used to forecast

future demands, namely a) linear, b) exponential and c) cubic models. For a highly reliable projection, the coefficient determinant or the R^2 should have a value of 1.00 or 100 percent. Based on the three selected models, the linear model gave an R^2 of 98.72 percent, the exponential model showed an R^2 of 98.11 percent, and the cubic model provided an R^2 of 98.88 percent. From these data, it can be inferred that the most suitable model is the cubic wherein the water demand for 2013 will reach 299.15 MLD. If supply stays at 280.50 MLD, it is possible that water supply will not be enough to supply the demand on or before 2013 (see Table 3). This information indicates that the problem of water supply may happen soon. However, the data shown do not consider additional supply of water derived from other pumps or sources, the impending dropping down or drying up of the water wells due to watershed denudation, over-extraction of water, and the impact of climate change.

TABLE 3. Projected water-supply demand in MLD

Year	Supply	DCWD	Linear	Exponential	Cubic
1997	280.50	134.61	121.20	134.58	134.94
2001	280.50	163.68	165.72	163.25	162.47
2005	280.50	199.03	210.24	198.03	200.07
2009	280.50	242.03	254.76	240.23	246.16
2011	280.50	280.50	277.02	264.59	271.89
2013	280.50	294.32	299.28	291.41	299.15
2017	280.50	357.87	343.80	353.50	357.46
2018	280.50		354.93	370.99	372.69
2019	280.50		366.06	389.34	388.13
2020	280.50		377.19	408.60	403.75



With this foreseen demand for water in the coming years, the DCWD, which was granted permit by NWRB in 1997 to use the Tamugan River, decided to make use of the river for extracting surface water for distribution. The plan can potentially save costs associated with power, since there is no need to install huge water pumps. Water can be allowed to freely flow down to the consumers. However, NWRB sets limits on the use of water to be extracted by DCWD. The latter can only use 4.678 cms (cubic meters per second) during the wet season, and 3.440 cms during the dry season (DCWD

2009). With this permissible level of extraction, DCWD can extract up to a maximum of 404.18 MLD during the wet season, and 297.22 MLD during the dry season. Adding to this extractable water to the current maximum capacity of DCWD at 280.5 MLD, it is possible to extract a total of 684.68 MLD during the wet season and 577.72 MLD during the dry season. Without considering the impact of climate change, watershed denudation, and water wells fatigue, this production is adequate to supply Davao City the needed water even beyond 2020.

Power

The distribution of power in Mindanao is done at a larger scale wherein all power plants are interconnected via transmission lines. These interconnected sources and distribution is known as grid. The NGCP is responsible for managing the transmission of energy from the generating plants. The power grid in Mindanao is subdivided into six districts, namely: Northeastern Mindanao Area (NEMA), Lanao, North Central Mindanao Area (NCMA), Northwestern Mindanao Area (NWMA), Southeastern Mindanao Area (SEMA), and Southwestern Mindanao Area (SWMA). Davao City belongs to the Southeastern Mindanao Area. Distribution of power in the city is accomplished through the DLPC.

The Mindanao power grid is being supplied by hydropower plants (53.55 percent), oil-based power plants (28.44 percent), coal thermal power plants (11.99 percent), geothermal power plants (5.96 percent), and solar power plants (0.06 percent) located in the Mindanao area (TRANSCO 2008). The interconnection of these power plants is being handled and monitored by NGCP. Of the power generated, approximately 75 percent is generated from Northern Mindanao and only about 25 percent is produced in Southern Mindanao and Western Mindanao (see Table 4). All power produced are distributed to three areas, of which Southern Mindanao consumes the most. As shown in Table 4, Southern Mindanao needs 236 MW more than what it is currently generating at 373 MW in order to meet its demand. Moreover, transmitting power from Northern Mindanao to Southern Mindanao entails cost due to transmission losses and installation costs of transmission systems.

TABLE 4. Capacity in Northern, Southern and Western Mindanao

Area	Installed Capacity		Dependable Capacity		Peak Demand		Reserve
	MW	%	MW	%	MW	%	
Northern Mindanao	1448	74.87	1259	74.85	464	38.57	795
Southern Mindanao	373	19.29	323	19.20	559	46.47	-236
Western Mindanao	113	5.84	100	5.95	180	14.96	-80
Total	1934		1682		1203		

Source: Department of Energy 2009

The DOE in 2009 projected that the peak demand for power will exceed the installed capacity starting the year 2014 (see Table 5). Nonetheless, if the reserved margin would be included in the peak demand, or that the required capacity is used as the basis for projection, then the required capacity has already exceeded installed capacity since 2010. Reserved margin is the required capacity to be maintained to ensure continuous supply of power in case one of the plants breaks up at any given time, ensuring power systems availability. As shown in Table 5, a 21 percent reserved margin was used by the DOE. In the first quarter of 2010, Mindanao experienced an energy crisis (Senate of the Philippines 2010). Hydropower plants, both at the Lanao and Pulangi areas, generated outputs of less than 50 percent of their expected capacities. As a result, power curtailment was implemented.


TABLE 5. Mindanao power supply outlook in MW (2008-2017)

Particular	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Installed Capacity	1682	1682	1682	1682	1682	1682	1682	1682	1682	1682
Required Reserved Margin	278	288	301	313	326	340	354	370	387	406
Percent of Peak Demand	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%
Peak Demand	1325	1372	1431	1488	1552	1618	1688	1763	1844	1932
Required Capacity	1603	1660	1732	1801	1878	1958	2042	2133	2231	2338

Source: Department of Energy 2009

On the basis of the data published by the DoE, three statistical models were used to predict energy demand. All statistical models showed high level of determination: The linear model produced a coefficient determination (R^2) of 99.33 percent, the exponential model 99.91 percent, and the cubic model 1.00 or 100.00 percent. Using the cubic model, it was found that the demand for power in 2014 would reach 1688 MW which is about the same as the installed capacity of 1682 MW. The projection shows that starting 2014 or even before 2014, that is, presupposing that the power plants do not work on their designed capacity, it is highly probable the problem on energy may happen (see Table 6). This would further mean then that there is a need to install new energy capacities. Forecasted power here does not consider the reserved margin.

TABLE 6. Mindanao power supply-demand in MW



Among all the districts in Mindanao, SEMA, which also includes Tagum City and General Santos City, consumes more power than any other district (see Table 7). While no data on the distribution of power to Davao consumers are available to date, it is presumed that, due to the evident development of Davao City, its demand constitutes majority of the power consumption as reflected under SEMA. Distribution of power in the city is as follows:

Residential buildings (33.64 percent); commercial buildings (13.6 percent); industrial buildings (50.58 percent); and other purposes (2.17 percent). At present, more subdivisions and big establishments are being constructed in the city. As shown in Table 4, Davao City relied heavily on its source of power from Northern Mindanao. With the growth of other neighboring cities, the establishment of more companies, and the threat of climate change, Davao City's development may be hampered by insufficient power to meet its present and future needs.

TABLE 7. Mindanao grid districts

District	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
NEMA	157	170	176	185	195	205	215	226	239	252	266
LANAO	190	208	220	228	234	240	246	254	262	272	282
NCMA	199	208	215	225	234	243	252	263	275	287	301
NWMA	124	133	138	144	150	156	163	170	178	187	197
SEMA	372	392	403	419	436	453	471	491	513	536	561
SWMA	199	214	220	229	239	256	271	283	296	310	325
Total	1241	1325	1372	1430	1488	1553	1618	1687	1763	1844	1932

Source: TRANSOCO 2008

Tamugan River exploration and contesting parties

With the looming water and energy crisis, explorations had been done to locate a potent source of water that possesses acceptable water quality and sufficient water volume to meet Davao City's future needs. High quality surface water is necessary for drinking purposes, while a large volume is relevant for power generation and other uses. Evaluated rivers include Lipadas, Talomo, Davao, Tagulaya, Sibulan, Tamugan and Panigan. Tamugan River, which was found to have the highest quality of water (Class AA) and lying within the jurisdiction of Davao City, was identified as the top choice. The water resource of the Tamugan River is viewed as a solution to issues related to water distribution and availability of power.

Figure 3 shows the proposed architecture of the hydropower plant of Hedcor, Inc. to be installed at the Tamugan and Panigan rivers (Hedcor, Inc. 2009). It can be noted that a diversion weir is installed at the Talomo River. Diverted water coming from Talomo will be used to supply the 7.5 MW Panigan hydropower plant. Water output from Panigan will be used as a supplementary water supply to the 20.0 MW Tamugan hydropower plant.



FIGURE 3. Hedcor, Inc. proposed hydropower plant.
 Source: Hedcor, Inc. 2009, meters above sea level (MASL)

According to the DCWD, the installation of the diversion weir at the Talomo River will potentially affect the lower part of the river. During the dry season, it is highly possible that the diversion weir will be closed to divert water to the Panigan hydropower plant. However, during the roundtable discussion at the ADDU in 2009, Hedcor, Inc. promised not to block the flow of water in the Talomo River in times of drought. Further, the Talomo River provides a significant contribution to the extraction of water at the Dumoy plants. As claimed by DCWD (2009), the Dumoy aquifer is composed of 40 percent rain water while 48 percent (80 percent of 60 percent) is derived from Talomo River (see Table 8). Hedcor, Inc. contested these data. Table 8 shows other points of disagreement between DCWD and Hedcor., Inc.

TABLE 8. DCWD and Hedcor, Inc. data comparison

DCWD	Hedcor, Inc.
Direct infiltration accounts for 40 percent of recharge.	Direct infiltration accounts for 40 percent of aquifer recharging in lower levels.
River soaking accounts for 60 percent of recharge.	River soaking accounts for 60 percent of aquifer recharging below 300 masl.
Talomo River	
Talomo River accounts for 80 percent (of the 60 percent) of the recharge of the aquifer.	Talomo River accounts for possibly 70 percent of the recharge of the aquifer.
Diversion will affect the aquifer and reduce the groundwater available to the pumping wells.	Lipadas system is also a likely major contributor to recharge.
Tamugan River	
Tamugan River accounts for 20 percent of the recharge of the aquifer.	Tamugan River accounts for 0 percent of the recharge of the Talomo aquifer.
Recharge between 600-400m (the Hedcor project affects the aquifer).	Recharge below 300m of Davao River aquifer (thus the Hedcor project does not affect the Talomo aquifer).

Source: Hedcor, Inc. 2009

Moreover, the management of DCWD declined more proposals from Hedcor, Inc. just so that the operation of the hydropower plant in Tamugan River can start. These include the proposal to use the waters of Tamugan and Panigan rivers to roll the turbines of the 27.5 MW hydropower plants (1 unit, 7.5 MW; 2 units, 10 MW). Hydropower plants are cascaded to optimize the harvesting of water. DCWD was offered to use the water as a commodity to be directly distributed to consumers for drinking and other purposes. However, based on the study by Lotti in 2000 and Hedcor, Inc. in 2007, if Hedcor will be allowed to use the water at Tamugan River, DCWD can make use of only 0.12 cms, that is, if DCWD will not use the Hedcor water outflow, while Talomo River will be left with only 0.21 cms if the weir will be closed (see Table 9). DCWD did not give in to Hedcor, Inc.

Table 9. Water Flow at Tamugan and Talomo rivers

A. Tamugan River (estimated flow)	
Total flow of Tamugan and Panigan rivers at the confluence	= 11.00 cms
Requirements of Hedcor	= 10.88 cms
Remaining flow for DCWD	= 0.12 cms
B. Talomo River (mean annual flow)	
Total flow of Upper Talomo River at Hedcor’s property diversion tunnel	= 2.58 cms
Proposed diverted water	= 2.37 cms
Remaining flow	= 0.21 cms

Sources: Lotti 2000; Hedcor, Inc. 2009

Conclusion

The projection that the demand both for water and power will surpass the available supply in the nearest future is a challenge that confronts the entire island of Mindanao, particularly Davao City. One way to address this is to encourage people to seriously conserve the use of water and energy. Another is to develop and implement local and national policies to protect the watershed both for water and energy use. Establishing and maintaining an open communication and close coordination between concerned agencies—public and private—to discuss ways to achieve sustainable development for Davao City is also a positive step. In the case of the tug-of-war between the DCWD and Hedcor, Inc. on the question of who should operate and use the water resource of Tamugan River, the third solution is obviously absent. As a result, the city’s development is left hanging in a balance. Indeed, while water is a very important natural resource because it supports the lives of animals, plants, and human beings, and considering the fact that it is used to produce electricity, deciding on its proper purpose could prove to be a difficult and challenging task. And yet it is a concern that must be urgently addressed for the sake of the future of Davao City.

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Appendix 1

Talomo-Lipadas Watershed¹

The Talomo-Lipadas watershed is a vital location for the city of Davao. It is believed to contain recharge areas and is the source of aquifers for the Davao City Water District (DCWD) Dumoy water wells and pumping stations. At the same time, it provides agro-economic opportunities and settlement areas for migrants within the vicinity. To ensure high quality of water, aquifers require clean surroundings which are devoid of contaminants to surface water.

Groundwater, however, is often vulnerable to contamination. Agricultural production, manufacturing operations, and settlements may produce pollutants that could affect the aquifer. As pointed by Prantilla (2008), it takes at least thirty years for the water from recharge points to reach the aquifer of Dumoy. Moreover, some of the contaminants and perturbations that most likely affect the groundwater are: Geological-lithological (formation of infiltration and percolation zones); morphological (surface form); geochemical (binding conditions of soil, composition of pollutants); physical (adhesive and cohesive forces in soils); and hydrogeological (surface and subterranean flows, flow direction and velocity) characteristics of the watershed area supplying water to the aquifer and above the aquifer (Prantilla 2008). In addition to the contamination and disturbance of the groundwater, the increasing population and weak legislation to protect watershed areas can contribute to the vulnerability of the Tamugan River.

The Talomo-Lipadas River extends to five districts of Davao City, which has forty-seven barangays. In 1980, the population in the covered area was estimated to reach 261,572; and, in just twenty years, it reached a population level of 552,767. This increase translates to a rate of 3.74 percent annually. With the current rate, it is most likely that population would reach one million in less than two decades. High population growth rates in the five districts would mean expanded use of land area and, therefore, increased disturbance to water and reduced production of water.

Two identified elements that heavily affected watershed areas are urbanization and increased agricultural activities in the area, and excessive deforestation of the forest cover. A study conducted by the Geosciences Division of Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) XI showed that land utilization within the Talomo-Lipadas watershed rests primarily on urbanization and various agricultural activities.

¹ Most of the information in this section was extracted from the presentation of Dr. Prantilla (2008).

Barangays Calinan, Tugbok and Toril demonstrate highly urbanized characteristics where hospitals, universities, churches, markets, and high-density residential areas, industries, among others, can be found. Agricultural lands are used to grow root crops, tree crops, rice, corn, vegetables and other plants. Meanwhile, it was estimated in 1987 that the closed forest cover of Talomo-Lipadas watershed was 6,170 hectares. In just fifteen years, the forest cover has been significantly reduced to 2,593 hectares, which is 42.03 percent, compared to the 1987 forest cover (Philippine Council for Energy and Environmental Management [PCEEM] 2006). The reduction of forest cover may have an impact on the capacity of the watershed to recharge its aquifers: This may cause accelerated erosion of soil and may potentially increase the occurrence of floods.

*The Deduction of the Possibility and Actuality of Evil in Schelling's Of Human Freedom*¹

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ABSTRACT: The paper aims to provide an introduction to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's enigmatic masterpiece *Philosophical investigation into the essence of human freedom and matters connected therewith*. It uncovers some of its themes namely God's self-revelation, the processes of creation, human nature, and evil. It presents some of the underlying arguments of Schelling's notoriously difficult work. More specifically, the paper explains how the possibility and actuality of evil can be deduced through the presentation of God in terms of ground and existence and his self-manifestation as such.

KEYWORDS: God, evil, ground, existence, will of ground, will of love, self-manifestation

Introduction

This essay concerns one of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's enigmatic masterpiece *Philosophical investigation into the essence of human freedom and matters connected therewith* (*Of human freedom*) that is now recognized as an indispensable work in German Idealism,² particularly after the publication of Martin Heidegger's elaboration of Schelling's work. Along with the serious works in the form of notable evaluation of the works of Schelling as a whole, which are written by prominent thinkers such as Walter Schulz, Manfred Frank, and Slavoj Žižek, Heidegger's exposition of Schelling's *Of human freedom* has gradually restored its authority and claimed a special place in the corpus of

Schelling's entire works (Love and Schmidt 2006, ix). The purpose of this present essay is to provide an introduction to Schelling's notoriously difficult text. Far from being pretentious, this essay is not intended to be an exhaustive introduction to the work. Its main focus is to carefully uncover the deduction of the possibility and actuality of evil in Schelling's *Of human freedom*.

I will begin by outlining the general underlying arguments of Schelling's *Of human freedom*. Then, I will present how the possibility and the actuality of evil can be deduced by presenting God in terms of ground and existence and his self-manifestation as such. I will eventually end this paper with some concluding remarks.

The General Arguments

Schelling's consideration of the concept of freedom is based on his conviction that its investigation must always coincide with the investigation of its relation to a system as a whole. The true meaning of a concept, for Schelling (1936, 7), can only be revealed in terms of its "systematic completion," which appears through a "demonstration of its connections with the whole." This simply means that an adequate definition of a concept must take into account its connections with all concepts preserved in the system. Schelling himself counters the common belief that the unity and completeness in every philosophy presupposes a thorough system rendering no place for anything indeterminate, for example, freedom. This view is based on a false thesis that a system is characterized by restrictedness and determinateness,³ leaving no room for a harmonious connection between system and freedom.

Rejecting this account will bring us to the true understanding of Schelling's task purported to be developed in *Of human freedom*. For Schelling, knowledge on the reconciliation of system and freedom is not an insurmountable problem. One can attain such knowledge, and as such, one can clarify decisively the principle through which one attains it (Schelling 1936, 8). The assumption that such knowledge can be reached is based on the ancient doctrine of "like is recognised by like." The idea is that because human beings are free, then they can have knowledge of how their freedom

can be reconciled with a system. Such doctrine similarly allows one to maintain knowledge of the divine because “he alone comprehends the god outside himself through the god within himself by keeping his mind pure and unclouded by evil” (Schelling 1936, 8). According to Schelling (1936, 9), the reconciliation of system and freedom should alone occupy all philosophy as “a subject of an inevitable problem;” otherwise, all philosophy will have no value at all. Such reconciliation, then, is the utmost knowledge worth striving for. So what appears in *Of human freedom* is nothing more than the expression of Schelling’s strife, reconciling system and freedom, a self-set task framing together his efforts in the treatise.⁴

This task has to be understood in line with Schelling’s philosophical craving for setting forth an entire system, the unity of the “real” and the “ideal.” Such relation can be gleaned in his reinterpretation of Baruch Spinoza’s pantheism that at the same time demonstrates his own understanding of the law of identity. Schelling points to three generally considered interpretations of pantheism against which his objection and reinterpretation are raised: 1) A total identification of God; 2) an annihilation of all individuality: Everything else is as naught; and 3) a denial of freedom (Brown 1977, 121).

With regard to the first interpretation, Schelling maintains that the teachings of Spinoza render a more complete differentiation of things from God than any other tenet. He reiterates Spinoza’s tenet: “God is that which is in itself and is conceived solely through itself; whereas the finite necessarily exists in another being and can only be conceived with reference to it” (Schelling 1936, 12). By this, we consequently find that things and God are not only different in degree but also completely different in kind. Rejecting completely this total identification of God, Schelling further emphasizes that things, in whatever their relation to God may be, are absolutely different from God. They merely exist in or by virtue of being dependent upon another being, that is, God himself. Conversely, God exists in, by, and through himself. He is alone “independent and primary and self-affirming, all else being related to it only as what is affirmed, or as the consequence to the antecedent” (Schelling 1936, 12).

With respect to the second interpretation, Schelling (1936, 16) argues that it seems to be in contradiction with the first. If a pantheistic view of God annihilates all individuality, then it is meaningless to think of God as a total identification of all—as a whole. There would be no parts at all toward which God would be the whole.

As to the third interpretation, Schelling observes that freedom and pantheism are quite different from each other. The true understanding of the law of identity, he says, grants freedom its utmost revelation. The reason is that, in the law of identity, the unity of subject and predicate is of an “intrinsically creative kind,” instead of being a merely mechanical and abstract relation as maintained in Spinoza’s pantheism. Furthermore, Schelling argues that while the consequence is dependent upon the ground it does not necessarily mean that the latter determines the nature of the former. The unity of the ground and the consequence manifests the dependency of the consequence upon the ground, and not what the consequence is or is not (Schelling 1936, 18). That is to say, in the law of identity, the identity of things as different from and dependent upon God without being determined by God is preserved. Obviously, the use of the law of identity for exploring the unity of God and things maintains the nature of freedom in both. God does not determine things. As a result, the latter remain free and distinct.

From his discussion of the denial of freedom as not necessarily connected to pantheism, Schelling proceeds to reinterpret Spinoza’s pantheism. For him, Spinoza’s pantheism holds some grain of truth insofar as it unfolds the main characteristic of pantheism, namely the immanence of things in God. However, it is guilty of fatalism due to the fact that things are merely regarded as a “thing” in God, that they are conceived in terms of “deterministic causality” (Schelling 1936, 22). Deterministic causality means that the relation between God and things is based on a causal relation in which God causes things to exist as a consequence, and as such, God determines all things. This fatalism arises because of an abstract conception of all creatures. In contrast, Schelling (1936, 22) affirms a vital and dynamic conception of nature. He proposes that the abstractness and lifelessness of Spinoza’s pantheism has to be spiritualised by idealism as a vital basis (Schelling 1936,

22). A vital basis is a new state achieved: 1) Through a more elevated way of comprehending nature as opposed to regarding nature simply as “thing” in God; and 2) through the lively and dynamic unity of God and things, instead of the mechanistic and lifeless form of unity presented in Spinoza’s.

Schelling believes that from this newly transfigured pantheism a real philosophy of nature can be developed, that is, a whole system in which the “real” and the “ideal” are united. He tries to establish a lively and creative account of the unity of God and things (the real part) through giving an account of freedom (the ideal part). In developing an account of freedom, Schelling is actually conceptualizing or systematizing freedom. This is not an effort to reduce freedom into an abstract concept or system but to identify it with the constitution of God as well as man’s being—the constitution of life. Through this system of freedom, Schelling seeks to unify freedom and necessity, the “ideal” and the “real.”

After presenting an outline of the general arguments of *Of human freedom*, let me proceed to a discussion of its specific contents. Heidegger (1985, 104) captures very well the true meaning of Schelling’s investigation in *Of human freedom*: “The key question of the main investigation is the question of the inner possibility and of the kind of reality of evil. The intention of this investigation is to provide a full and live concept of human freedom. Thus the right center for the plan of the system of freedom is to be gained.” For Heidegger (1985, 97), the question of the possibility and the actuality of evil, or in his terms “a metaphysics of evil,” is the question of the ground of the system of freedom, the question of being. It is with this background in mind that I proceed in the next sections.

On God as Ground and Existence: A Philosophy of the Will

Schelling (1936, 31-32) clearly asserts that his investigation is based on the distinction between “[b]eing insofar as it exists, and [b]eing insofar as it is the mere basis of existence.” Schelling (1936, 32) proceeds to apply this distinction to God: “As there is nothing before and outside of God he must contain within himself the ground of his existence.” According to Schelling,

the truth of this duality of being—ground and existence—is vulnerable to being reduced into a mere concept. But this must not be the case. He insists that it should be regarded instead as “real and actual,” meaning, it is the movement of life rather than a system (Schelling 1936, 88). Although the ground is within God himself, it is not God from the perspective of God as existence, or God as the absolute. The ground is merely, Schelling (1936, 32) explains, “the basis of his existence, it is nature-in God, inseparable from him, to be sure, but nevertheless distinguishable from him.” As he proceeds to apply this distinction to things, Schelling arrives at the stance that things, as totally different from God, share with God the same basis out of which they can carry on their own process of becoming. This basis, which is within God but which is not God himself, is nothing other than the ground of God’s existence. God’s existence is what emerges from that which is within him, which is not God himself, and in emerging, ultimately reveals itself (Heidegger 1985, 104). This means that God’s existence is his self-revelation, his self-manifestation.

Schelling uses the analogy of gravity and light in nature to explain the principles of ground and existence. In this analogy, he says that the precedence of gravity, which is analogous to ground, over light, which is analogous to existence, is neither the “precedence in time” nor the “priority of essence” (Schelling 1936, 33). There is no first and later or even last as to the distinction between ground and existence. Neither of the two is more important than the other. Both imply each other. Neither of them is without the other.

Schelling further seeks to explain the ground in anthropomorphic terms. He calls the ground as “the longing in which God feels to give birth to himself,” a yearning to bear himself in a unity of life with his existence which, to this extent, “is not yet the unity in its own self.” Rather, it is “co-eternal” within God, that the ground of God is an inseparable part of his existence. One part cannot exist without another part and that both are two eternal beginnings of God in his absolute existence and creation (Schelling 1936, 34 and 89). As a mere longing, the ground is “not yet” a conscious will but a prescient will, a will without understanding. It therefore refers to darkness, obscurity, and

unruliness. Given the fact that this ground is dark, obscure and unruly, Schelling (1936, 34) calls it as “the incomprehensible basis of reality.” Since it is before understanding, this initial will is comparable to “desire or passion;” it is “the lovely urge of a developing being striving to unfold itself, whose inner actions are undeliberate” (Schelling 1936, 75). The will refers to a kind of anticipation toward some thing or object which is not fully determined. Schelling (1936, 88) uses the anthropomorphic term “will” as a key to understand ground and existence, the “twofoldness of the principles.”

According to Schelling, there are two different wills, the will of ground, one that is always striving toward the ground, and the will of love, which is God’s own will to manifest himself. These two wills exist by themselves and become one because they, in their very beginning, function in themselves (Schelling 1936, 52 and 74-75). By this, God becomes himself insofar as he exists. Only through God’s will of love, which is active, as opposed to the reaction of the will of ground, that God is in his absolute existence. The will of ground always returns to itself such that “a basis of being might ever remain” (Schelling 1936, 36). In this lively contradiction of the two wills, we can properly understand the true meaning of ground and existence as the two principles of being according to which the being of God and creation is revealed. This is therefore essentially a philosophy of will, since the essential meaning of God’s being can only be grasped appropriately by presenting the two principles of the will of ground and the will of love. This account of the two principles is the main basis for comprehending God’s self-manifestation, making the creation of all creatures intelligible.

On God’s Self-Manifestation: A Theory of Creation

In the foregoing section, we conceive of God’s being in terms of ground and existence. The existence of God is the fulfilment of his own longing to give birth to himself, which is the ground, one that is within God yet is not God. God cannot simply relinquish the ground since it is the condition of his own dynamic impetus to be himself. This dynamic impetus inevitably

terminates in God's self-manifestation. As the united principles that reveal God's being, ground and existence are thus the constitution of the inner structure of God.

Schelling (1936, 78 and 84) asserts that the unity of the two principles, insofar as it determines the being of God, should be conceived on the basis of the concept of life: "[I]n the divine understanding there is a system; God himself, however, is not a system but a life." Werner Marx accentuates the interpretation of God's being in terms of the notion of life. He explains: "Life is that which is capable of developing itself on its own and which thus manifest itself by producing luminosity, spirituality, and regularity out of darkness, obscurity, and unruliness" (Marx 1984, 66). Since it reveals itself on its own, life is *causa sui*. In revealing itself, life presupposes a contradiction out of which it gains its true manifestation. Luminosity, spirituality, and regularity need their counter-condition—darkness, obscurity, and unruliness—to reveal themselves. In this sense, the constitution of life is comprised of two contradictory powers. Both must always be in tension so as to sustain life, yet compose a sheer unity in which life attains its true revelation. The indispensable significance of the contradiction for understanding life is clearly stated in *Of human freedom*: "[W]here there is no battle there is no life" (Schelling 1936, 80). Schelling (1936, 84) further emphasizes: "All life...is subject to suffering and development....For being is only aware of itself in becoming...there is in being no becoming; in the latter, being is itself rather posited as in eternity; but in actuali[z]ation, there is necessarily a becoming." Life itself should be understood as becoming since it entails the process of becoming toward its actuality, in its full meaning insofar as it is that which emerges from its counter-condition—the condition of darkness.

With respect to God's being, its process of becoming is conceivable under the notion of "a leap" or "spontaneity." It reveals the immediacy of God's self-manifestation, a perfect unity of ground and existence unwrapping divine life such as freedom (Marx 1984, 68).⁵ This divine life acquires its full meaning in God's will to manifest himself and, at the same time, to create. Therefore, to speak of God's self-manifestation is to speak of the creation.

Before presenting his theory of creation, Schelling (1963, 35) first indicates what he calls “an inward, imaginative response, corresponding to this longing,” which is the first response of God toward the operation of the ground. In this first response, in line with his self-manifestation, God “sees himself in his own image” (Schelling 1936, 35). This image is already in God and occurs in God himself. God has his own first imagination of himself as his own image. Schelling (1936, 35) identifies this self-image of God as “God–begotten God himself.” In this identification, Schelling makes references to the process of giving birth. God gives birth to himself, that is, the begotten–God. However, to the extent that the begotten–God is a result of a process of giving birth, he is different from God, although he is actually God himself. Because the begotten–God is different from God, the process of giving birth is then a process of differentiation—God’s self-differentiation. This first response of God is distinct from the process of creation although both arise from God’s desire for self-manifestation.

The process of creation has to be understood in terms of the eternal contradiction of God’s inner structure, namely ground and existence. The role of this eternal contradiction is the imperative link in apprehending the relation between the identity of God and creation (Pfau in Schelling 1994, 43). The ground never remains settled in a perfect unity with existence, but keeps struggling in accordance with its will, the will of ground (Schelling 1994, 34 and 36). Schelling (1994, 38 and 39) explicitly declares that every being that “has risen in nature” contains the two principles of being—ground and existence—as a unity.⁶ He also figures that the principle of darkness (the ground, since it resides in depth) excites “the self-will of creatures” that always stands opposed to the universal will (Schelling 1994, 38 and 58). He refers to this as the process of creation of all creatures, save the human being. The process of creation is characterized by the fact that as God wills his self-revelation, he lets the ground operate against existence. On the one hand, this operation of the ground excites the self-will, which then struggles against the universal will. On the other hand, the universal will keeps determining the self-will in that it makes use of the self-will and subordinates it into itself by treating it as a mere tool. The self-will performs a service for the universal

will insofar as the latter wills this creation through the self-will. Thus, in and among creatures except the human being, the unity of the two principles manifests a kind of “despotic relationship.”

The case of the human being is different. The struggle of the self-will to go back to the ground corresponds to its elevation to a unity with the universal will. In the human being, the very deep ground and the purest understanding reside together as one whole: “In [man], there are both centers—the deepest pit and the highest heaven” (Schelling 1994, 38). In the human being, the power of the two principles collides with each other as a dynamic unity and where the two principles mutually excite each other toward their own fulfilment. The self-will is elevated toward unity with the universal will, which is spirit; at the same time, it reaches the inmost domain of the ground, which is also spirit. This spiritualized self-will is the selfhood in the human being (Schelling 1994, 39), suggesting that the self-will is not merely a tool and subordinated to the universal will.

Moreover, Schelling (1994, 38) uses the term “Word” to clarify the difference between the human being and other creatures: “[T]he (real) Word, pronounced, exists only in the unity of light and darkness (vowel and consonant)...Only in man, then, is the Word completely articulate, which in all other creatures was held back and left unfinished.”⁷ Because the two principles are united in the human being, he is raised to a higher level than other creatures. However, Schelling (1994, 38) cautions: “[T]hat unity which is indissoluble in God must be dissoluble in man.” If the unity of the principles of being in the individual were inseparable, then by necessity man would be the same as God. If this were the case, there would have been no self-manifestation of God by which the process of creation is explicable. This dissolubility of the unity of the two principles in the human being constitutes the condition of his essence.

The Deduction of the Possibility of Evil

From the foregoing section, we know that the process of creation has to be understood in terms of God’s self-manifestation consisting of a threefold process.⁸ First is God’s first response to the operation of the ground

in which God gives birth to his own image, that is, the begotten–God. This is God’s self-differentiation. He is differentiated from himself yet in himself through the begetting of his own image. Second is the uttering of the “Word” to create all creatures—the process of creation. There are two modes of the creature—the human being and all other creatures. The human being is lifted up beyond other creatures because in his selfhood (the spiritualized self-will) the two principles of being—ground and existence—are united. Each of them collides with its opposite, according to Žižek (1996, 64), as “its opposite’s inherent constituent.” Neither of them can have its power in disposing of its opposite. And the third is the underlying ground, which is always in rebellion against the light. This is the condition of God’s self-manifestation: That God must keep the ground striving against the light so as to manifest himself.

Now, how can we apprehend the possibility of evil in terms of this threefold process of God’s self-manifestation? Since the self-will is spiritualized by its grasping of the innermost ground and its elevation to the universal will, then the two principles of ground and existence in the human being reach their full power and are united in a separable unity. From this dissoluble unity, the possibility and the capability of the human being to dwell in darkness and in light can be derived. Schelling, however, does not explain the meaning of his claim that the two principles reach their full power. Rather, he simply posits this as constituting the dissolubility of their unity in the human being, constituting the possibility of good (dwelling in light) and evil (dwelling in darkness) (Schelling 1936, 39).

Schelling (1936, 39) says that the account of the possibility of evil is pursued insofar as it makes comprehensible the divisibility of the unity of the two principles. He begins by simply reiterating his initial concept pertaining to the self-will which wants to be a particular will in the human being as long as it is in unity with the universal will. He tries to express it in the terms of periphery and center: “[Self-will] may seek to be at the periphery that which it is only insofar as it remains as the center” (Schelling 1936, 40). The center here is analogous to the unity with the universal will while the periphery is analogous to the dwelling in the ground. Schelling stresses the

indispensability of the self-will to remain at the periphery. Otherwise, there would be no dissolubility of the unity of the two principles, meaning that there would be no human being or creation in general: “[H]ardly does self-will move from the center which is its station, then the nexus of forces is also dissolved” (Schelling 1936, 41).

Schelling proceeds to deal with the concept of evil by explaining the divisibility of the unity of the two principles. Here, he makes use of the metaphor of disease (Schelling 1936, 41-42). The human being experiences disease as something very real, a “feeling” that makes us gloomy. However, there is nothing essential in it. Disease is nothing else than a kind of illusion or an arbitrary appearance in his life. As such, it has no meaning in the least because life remains, if only transfigured in a disordered appearance. Schelling (1936, 41-42) describes the condition of disease with regard to the activation of the ground: “Disease of the whole organism can never exist without the hidden forces of the depths being unloosed; it occurs when the irritable principle which ought to rule the innermost tie of forces in the quite deep, activates himself.” While being healthy means “the restoration of separate and individual life to the inner light of the being, whence there recurs the division (crisis)” (Schelling 1936, 42). This shows that the state of being healthy in the human being is achieved as a result of the process of going back to the state of life wherein he becomes ill due to a disease. In the context of the unity of the two principles, this state refers to the divisibility of their unity, constituting the possibility of goodness and evil. If the possibility of goodness and evil is derived from this divisible unity attaining their full power in the human being, then the ground that excites the self-will in him cannot be made of “insufficiency” or “deprivation.”

Schelling proposes a way of explaining the dissolubility of the two principles’ unity in terms of matter and form. He says that in the context of evil (as the possibility of evil becomes real) the matter of the two principles is the same, namely ground and existence that collide with each other in the spiritualized self-will. But their form is different here because the power of the ground overwhelms existence in the spiritualized self-will. This explanation will be used to clarify goodness and evil as they are actualized in the human being’s essence.

The Deduction of the Actuality of Evil

As we have seen, the possibility of evil is derived from the dissolubility of the unity of the two principles—ground and existence—in the human being. This separable unity is the essential condition of his essence who cannot remain in indecision (Schelling 1936, 50). It is an essential condition since the power of darkness collides with the power of light, allowing the human being the possibility of making a primordial decision. This decision constitutes his essence.

What we are to explore now is the actuality of evil which is, according to Schelling (1936, 49), the “chief subject in question.” In this respect, Schelling demands that there are three things to be explored, namely 1) the universal effectiveness of evil, 2) the process of how it comes to be real in the human being, and 3) the process of how it could have burst forth from creation as “an unmistakable principle” (1936, 49-50). These will be discussed below along with Schelling’s description of the nature of God in view of evil, thereby reaching “the highest point of the whole inquiry,” the love beyond God.

According to Schelling (1936, 58):

There is...*a universal evil*, even if it is not active from the beginning but is only aroused in God’s revelation....Only after recognising evil in its universal character is it possible to comprehend good and evil in man too. For if evil was already aroused in the first creation and was finally developed into a general principle through the self-cent[ere]d operation of the basis, then man’s natural inclination to evil seems at once explicable.

Evil becomes possible in the human being because the unity of the principles is separable. This possibility of evil is a faculty insofar as it is a capability in him by which he can make his primordial decision. However, the capability of making a decision becomes a real decision as it follows the inclination or solicitation to that which makes a decision possible. Thus, there has to be an inclination to evil, an inclination through which the human being can decide upon evil. Since evil has been aroused in the first creation, and will always solicit him throughout his history in accordance with the relentless operation of the ground, there is a universal solicitation to evil. This universal evil is not yet a real evil as such, but a possible evil pervasive in all human history.

Schelling (1936, 54-55) seeks to pursue universal evil as he uncovers the stages of creation in the history of the human being. According to him, the human being's stages of creation have to be understood in accordance with this following pattern: "It is God's will to universalise everything, to live it to unity with light or to preserve it therein; but the will of the deep is to particularize everything or to make it creature-like" (Schelling 1936, 58). This tells us that the only condition of the creation of the human being is nothing other than the never-ending craving of the ground toward itself, the domain of darkness. Since the operation of the ground is essentially necessary to the process of creation and to God's self-revelation, the universal evil that is aroused through this operation becomes a necessary condition insofar as it excites the human being to decide upon evil as part of the constitution of his essence.

Meanwhile, with regard to the process of how evil comes to be real in the human being, Schelling (1936, 63) has this to say: "But just this inner necessity itself freedom; man's being is essentially his own deed. Necessity and freedom interpenetrate as one being, which appears as the one or the other only as regarded from various aspects; in itself it is freedom, but formally regarded, necessity." The human being's essence is his own deed. This means that every human being is essentially has to determine himself so as to become an actual individual. This then is a primal as well as primordial determination of the human being, since it is pertaining to his existence or non-existence as an individual. He must, out of necessity, decide upon these primordial choices, namely "to be" or "not to be." Only by making this decision can he become an actual individual living in this world. To become an actual individual is to have for himself an essence which determines him as a living being in this world. Hence, what he has to decide on is his own essence in order to be an actual—not potential—individual. This decision has to be regarded as his own deed. Because the primordial decision constituting the essence of the human being is necessarily to be determined, then his essence is necessity. Necessity here, however, is not a compulsion since his essence is his own decision and as such freedom. Therefore, from the perspective of the essence of the human being, freedom is necessity and vice versa.

Furthermore, Schelling (1936, 66) argues: “[A]s man acts here so he has acted since eternity and already in the beginning of creation.” Man’s primordial act of decision constituting his own essence cannot be understood in terms of a particular juncture in the order of time; rather as something “already” made from all eternity.⁹ Every individual thus experiences himself at his birth as he who has determined himself to be who he is (Heidegger 1985, 155). As an eternal act, the primordial decision exceeds his consciousness (Schelling 1936, 64). This eternal act is a precondition for his consciousness in that it is experienced by every individual at his birth as something that is “already” made in eternity. Only by this act can he become conscious of his essence. Because the eternal act does not occur in the human being’s consciousness, Schelling (1936, 65) says that this act of decision remains the responsibility of every individual.

By now, it is clear that goodness and evil are actualized in the human being’s essence, which is necessarily constituted by his own primordial decision—the freedom to goodness and evil. What remains unclear, however, is how evil and goodness can be understood in terms of the united but separable two principles of ground and existence. In our discussion of the dissolubility of the unity of the two principles, we have seen that each principle can become dominant over the other. From this, the *possibility* of goodness and evil is derived. But, how is the *actuality* of goodness and evil with respect to the separable unity of the principles explained? This can be shown in two ways—qualitatively and formally.¹⁰

Qualitatively speaking, as the self-will which is excited in the human being through the operation of ground dominates the universal will, evil surpasses goodness in the realm of his essence. Conversely, as the universal will subdues the self-will, goodness encompasses evil. Thus the unity of the two principles of ground and existence in accordance with actual goodness and evil, is regarded in terms of a difference in degree between the two principles. One is therefore dominant over the other. *Formally* speaking, the essence of the human being is actually a perverted configuration of the two principles in that one is overwhelming another. If an individual decides to be essentially evil, meaning that evil dominates over goodness, the configuration

of the two principles is then perverted since ground subsumes existence into its realm. Conversely, when an individual decides to be essentially good, then existence subsumes ground. In the human being, evil and goodness always appear concomitantly. The appearance of evil in him means that evil dominates goodness, while the appearance of goodness in him means goodness dominates evil. His essence is never the freedom to goodness *OR* evil, but it is always the freedom to goodness *AND* evil. This is so because evil needs goodness as its essential opponent for it to be actualized. So, too, goodness needs evil. In this sense, evil becomes an “unmistakable principle;” it is an indispensable constituent of the human being’s essence.

After showing that the possibility and the actuality of evil are actually dependent on God’s self-manifestation, Schelling goes back to the investigation of the nature of God. This he explains in two parts: 1) The justification of God’s nature in view of evil; and 2) the consideration of the ultimate unity of everything. Without going into the details, let me present the arguments.

As to the first part, Schelling formulates the problem as follows: The process of creation arises from God’s free and conscious act to manifest himself by letting the ground strive toward itself. If God is free and conscious, he has to foresee the consequence of his act, particularly the arousal of evil from the operation of the ground. Because evil arises in the human being, God is thus the originator of evil. Schelling rejects this argument. He contends that God’s decision to let the ground incessantly strive against the light is essential to the absolute existence of God. God would not be who he is unless the ground keeps striving. Thus, this decision for letting the ground strive is a necessity to God’s self-manifestation, and therefore to the process of creation. Schelling (1936, 79) says: “[I]t cannot be said either, that evil comes from the depths or that the will of the depths is its primal cause. For evil can only arise in the innermost will of one’s own heart, and is never achieved without one’s own deed.”

With respect to the second part, Schelling considers the origin of the two principles of ground and existence. This is, Schelling declares, the highest point of the whole inquiry. According to him, this origin has to be designated as a “primal ground” or as “groundless,” which is “before all basis and before

all existence, that is, before any duality at all” (Schelling 1936, 87). Since this *groundless* precedes all, it does not contain any antitheses. Thus, any antithesis can by no means be present, explicable, or differentiable from it. The groundless is indifferent to all antitheses rather than designating their identity. Hence, it is an “absolute indifference.”

With regard to the two principles, Schelling (1936, 88) states: “[N]othing prevents their being predicated as non-antitheses, that is, in disjunction and each *for itself*; wherein, however, this duality...is established.” Schelling contends that even in the groundless, as an absolute indifference, there is nothing that prevents this. As indifferent to everything, its relation to the two principles is a “relation of total indifference.” As an absolute indifference, it reacts to them neutrally. That is to say, there is no reaction whatsoever to the two principles from the groundless, which as indifferent, is not yet a principle. If it responds to their being posited at all, the response is indifferent. Even if the relation of the groundless to the two principles is totally indifferent, Schelling (1936, 88) maintains that “instead of undoing the distinction [of the two principles]...the groundless rather posits and confirms it.” Only by this positing and confirmation does the real meaning of the opposition and not just its logical meaning, come to the fore.

This foregoing argument, however, seems to be incompatible with the concept of the groundless as an absolute indifference. If the response of the groundless to the positing of the two principles is indifferent, and if they are posited as indifferent, there cannot be any form of confirmation of their distinction. Schelling’s argument remains unclear in this respect. However, this groundless has to divide itself into two really opposing principles in order that they can find their unity in the absolute identity, which is God.

Schelling (1936, 90) completes his investigation by showing the absolute and general unity of all, that is, love beyond God:

[B]eyond the spirit is the initial ‘groundless’ which is no longer indifference (neutrality) but nonetheless not the identity of the two principles but rather the general unity, the same towards all but still not partisan to anything. It is now a beneficence which is free from all and which nonetheless works through all, in a word, it is love which is all in all.

As to the love beyond God, Schelling's explanation is not clear. He initially seems to identify this love also with God whose absolute existence necessitates the operation of the ground. He writes: "[T]his is the secret of love, that it unites such beings as could each exist in itself, and nonetheless neither is nor can be without the other" (Schelling 1936, 89).

In his final exposition of the groundless, the love beyond God, Schelling reaches the utmost unitary configuration of the principle of the real and the ideal, the so-called system of freedom, the problem that has plagued him throughout his philosophical odyssey. This is why he regards this as the highest point of his inquiry in *Of human freedom*. Herein, as we have seen, Schelling shows the origin of the two principles, namely: The groundless, the absolute indifference. The two principles reach their own full identity as opposites, yet as a perfect unity in God alone because God is the absolute identity. In God, the necessity of always letting the ground (the principle of the real) struggle against existence (the principle of the ideal) emerges out of his absolute freedom. Therefore, in God, there is a full identification between necessity and freedom, the reconciliation of necessity and freedom. This is the ground of the system of freedom. Schelling completes this reflection with a consideration of the original groundless, which is no longer indifference, but the love that is all in all.

Conclusion

To conclude, let me recall briefly the main themes of this paper: Firstly, Schelling considers God in terms of the two principles of being—ground and existence. In order to reveal himself, which is the will of love, God always lets the ground return to itself ensuing its own will, the will of the ground. Through this organic contradiction of the two wills, Schelling shows the essential meaning of God's being. Secondly, in his self-manifestation which necessitates the operation of the ground, God utters the "Word" in creation which is the process of creation itself. Thirdly, only from the dissolubility of the unity of the two principles can we deduce the possibility of goodness and

evil. This is the condition of the constitution of the essence of the human being. And fourthly, he essentially has to decide for constituting his essence, that is, the freedom to goodness and evil, from which we can derive the actuality of goodness and evil.

Notes

- 1 The full title of this work is *Philosophical investigation into the essence of human freedom and matters connected therewith*. The translation from which I quote goes under the name *Of human freedom*, one that is treated as the main corpus of my research: F. J. W. Schelling, *Of human freedom*, trans. by James Gutmann (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1936). In this paper, I will use Gutmann's pagination, although he indicates also the pagination of Schelling's "Works." I consult my reference directly to Gutmann's translation.
- 2 German idealism is a speculative philosophical movement in Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Its birth was primarily motivated by the desire to challenge the Enlightenment's worldview characterized by being skeptical, materialist, empiricist, and antimetaphysical. Its ultimate goal is to restore reason as the universal tool for the possibility of understanding. Its representatives include Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.
- 3 This means that the idea of a system is comprised mainly of things composed in a regular manner. This regularity, of course, imposes restriction and determination to all things consisted in a system, sparing no room for freedom characterized by indetermination. This, therefore, implies the necessity of the relation of all components in the system.
- 4 Schelling further formulates that the central problem of philosophy is the contradiction of necessity and freedom, the formulation that I shall use henceforth. Heidegger captures very well this transition or the re-formulation of the opposition. According to him, the formulation of the contradiction of necessity and freedom has a special sound to Schelling as detected in his own foreword to the treatise *Of human freedom* (1936, 3). This contradiction is claimed, Heidegger (1985, 57-62) asserts, as "the more primordial and higher formulation of the question of freedom."
- 5 Divine life understood as freedom can only be comprehensible in the context of God's will of love, a will that is eager to manifest itself into absolute existence, that is, the unity of ground and existence, as well as to create all creatures. Therefore, God's self-manifestation, as well as the process of creation, are nothing other than the manifestation of God's divine life, which is freedom, since they are out of God's will of love.
- 6 This "only to a certain extent" refers to the fact that the human being, as one of the creatures, is different from the other creatures: "[O]nly in him (man) did God love the world," "the very image of God" (cf. Schelling 1994, 38), "only in man...is the Word completely articulated, which in all other creatures was held back and left unfinished" (cf. Schelling 1994, 39).
- 7 The "Word," as it is articulated, also identifying the process of creation that arises from the operation of the ground allowed wilfully by God to strive back toward itself.

- 8 I wish to thank Prof. Martin Moors for emphatically stressing the general scheme of the two principles in his enlightening and erudite lectures on Schelling's treatise *Of human freedom* given during the fall semester of 2003 at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- 9 The use of "act of decision" is not entirely different from that of "decision." In using the former, I am emphasizing the dynamic character of decision as an act.
- 10 I am indebted here to Prof. Moors for his exposition on the reality of evil in individual as its particularity.

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Notes from a Language Exercise

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I

These notes are about an exercise tried out in a graduate school cultural anthropology class. The exercise involved bringing some current fieldwork material into class. The results were interesting both for a few things learned about one indigenous Mindanao language and for a few seeds of anthropological contemplation quietly sown on well-prepared soil.

The session began with two or three rounds of listening to some digital recording. After the first round, the students were asked, “What language was that?” In an earlier session, they had given their ethnic affiliations as Bisaya, Ilongo, Tagakaolo, Arumanen Manobo, Waray, Maranao, Tagalog, Ilocano, Iranun, Bikolano, or a combination of some of these. They were native users of the languages of their respective groups. Moreover, everyone was fluent in two or three Philippine languages. In answer to the question, each indicated that the language in the recording was not one they knew.

The follow-up was, “In spite of that, were you still able to understand it?” Not surprisingly, they had different degrees of understanding. The class as a whole, however, agreed over the general meaning of what was said in the recording, although as one student put it, “Not word for word.” For the second round thus, the class was listening more intently.

Next, a transcript of the recording was provided to each student. Attention shifted to written text, although the recording was played back a third time. The class was told to put aside temporarily all questions about

the circumstances of the recording and of the transcription, and the like. Instead, they were to direct their attention to the two principal speakers.

The transcript was as follows:¹

A: *Umm, sige. Binukid da.*

B: *Binukid?*

A: *Ho-o.*

B: *Yan a si Sonny Boy Talasan, taga Nabawang, intœlœk ta Pulangiyen, apo hi Datu Mandublas alias Datu Kunog-kunog.*

Yan a kinamagulangan na bata hi Nay-iluyan daw hi Man-iluyan. Sa ngaran papa ko si Nestor, sa mama ko si Susan. Bisan man sikay . . . aw, pobre da ba, sikay gihapon paniguro. Ah! Yan da.

A: *Hapila alan-alan ho mga œœlœd no?*

B: *Aw, kuan, sikay magsœœlœd . . . , atchu-ay kay da. Ha walo kay da buok.*

A: *Uh, atchu-ay da! Hapila na sa edad no iman?*

B: *Sa edad ko, baynte dos.*

A: *Baynte dos. Inu sa pigbuhat no iman? Panginabuhian no?*

B: *Panginabuhian ko iman, tagtrabaho a diya ta Malaybalay Stock Farm para ho . . . pag . . . makabulig ho pagpaeskuela taina mga atubay ko.*

The recording is of an ordinary use of Binukid. In retrospect, it did seem clearer that in the earlier rounds the class had quickly established the general language situation—someone was introducing himself—and was only struggling to fill in details. When the transcript was provided, a completion of many such details took place, with a clearer admission as well that some gaps could not be filled.

To check actual comprehension, the students were asked to summarize what was said in the recording. A number did so by attempting translations.

What is interesting is that they translated first into Bisaya and into Pilipino, and only later into English. Their translations were quite acceptable. The teacher's translation was unnecessary.

To the students therefore, the recording was quite intelligible *even at first contact* with the language. That has got to be the first and most important note. Had they not arrived at the degree of understanding they did, the rest of the exercise would have fallen flat. It is even more important for what it suggests at some higher plane.

Many people in urban Mindanao know two or three native Philippine languages—say, Bisaya, Ilongo, and Pilipino. Not that many may be aware that all of Mindanao's tribal languages belong to the same family as these three languages. A little thinking might help them realize that by far the most frequent use of tribal languages of Mindanao has got to be ordinary, day-to-day conversational and common situations. Therefore, certain would-be fieldworkers from the mainstream lowland culture might be surprised to find that, even during their very first experience of, say, Matigsalug or Mamanwa or Talaandig or Tagakaolo, the tribal language is not at all unintelligible.

An expanded next-edition of this exercise—to include an additional recording or two, at higher degree of difficulty, of a different language genre, from some other indigenous Mindanao groups, but selected to maintain the first-contact condition—might be a good idea.

II

For the next part of the exercise, each member of the class was given two lists. One was for all the words used in the recording and in the sequence these were used. The second was for the same words but in alphabetical sequence. This latter would show which words were used more than once. Everyone was instructed, among a few others, to put checks beside words whose meaning they knew or understood, and then to identify to which part of speech the marked words belong.

A not-so-random sampling here might give the reader some idea of the intervening individual work. Someone realized aloud that several words had a clear Spanish flavor—*pobre* was immediately given as an example and identified as an adjective. One laughed at the way *baynte* was spelled; two repeated the way *baynte dos* was actually pronounced by the main speaker. A third was concerned with whether numbers are nouns or adjectives. Another pointed out that the root word in *tagtrabaho* and *pagpaeskwela* would count as Spanish. Still another noted that the *sige* in the recording seemed to have a different meaning from what he remembered of college Spanish. When a lady shared that she had twenty-four units of Spanish during her college days, a gentleman observed that revealed her *edad*.

The class eventually moved on to the counting. From the first list, the transcript has 119 individual words and word-like units. To everyone in the class, one of these (*pag*) was merely the beginning of a word the speaker did not complete. Hence, there are only 118 “real” words in the text. Starting from the second list, “real” words used more than once were each counted only once. Such elimination yielded a third list of only seventy six distinct words. Of these, four were readily identified as interjections.² Another sixteen, either alone or along with others, are place names or personal names, and all were identified as such. Going by the check marks, these proper nouns were considered by the students something “known” and “understood.” That accounting left fifty-six other distinct words. Of these remaining fifty-six, anywhere from twenty-seven to thirty-one were “known” and “understood” by individual students. Or so they said.

The arithmetic was routine (though apparently unworthy of graduate students’ least exertion). Based on the marks on the first list, the students in effect indicated they knew and understood from 48 percent to 57 percent of the words. Based on the third list, the one that drops the one incomplete word and the all-too-easy interjections and proper names, the percentages were from 51 percent to 59 percent. When the proper nouns and interjections are counted in (as in the second list)—“Proper nouns and interjections are part of the language, no?”—the statistics rise to from 63 percent to 66 percent.

The probable inaccuracies notwithstanding, these numbers surprised even those who were minimally intellectually engaging in the exercise.

This was a first contact with Binukid, albeit ordinary Binukid and with the benefit of digital playback plus a read-at-will transcript. Even if the objections are allowed their worst, the fact survives all damage: The students were genuinely surprised at their *high degree of lexical familiarity* with the ordinary Pulangiyan Binukid they heard. That is the second note.

Again, it suggests a highly specialized job. There shall have to be some other time for a more rigorous, more systematic check of the lexical overlap of various dialectal variants of Binukid with each other, with the neighboring languages, and with Bisaya, Ilongo, and Tagalog, even if done only as a priest's general hobby. More importantly, this second note is part of the explanation for the first: No wonder they understood the recording!

In that light, the best students in the class asked two correct follow-through questions: “Language is more than just the vocabulary, no?” and “Father, perhaps you can train us on some fieldwork-relevant techniques so we can pick up a lot more on indigenous languages and do so faster?” These led, of course, to the main input items for the session.

Before closing this section, two little questions during the word-lists portion can illustrate the third note. The first was asked by one of the better students (who also observed that the shortest words were the ones most frequently used). It concerned the *si*, *hi* and *sa*, among others. She and a few others could correctly give Bisaya and Pilipino equivalents for these words, and yet could not quite pin down their meaning. More importantly, she could not honestly declare these to be prepositions or conjunctions or interjections; these obviously were not verbs, adverbs, adjectives, nouns, or pronouns.

She has every right to be confused as to the part of speech. That is so because the three words do not belong to any of the eight parts of speech with which Filipino students are familiar from English grammar classes. The three are, in fact, case marker particles. They have no meaning, but they perform crucially important grammatical functions. In the actual text, *si* is a marker for proper names in the subject case, while *hi* for proper names in

the object case³ and *sa* for common nouns in the subject case. Their removal from the sentences where they are found might occasion a gentle correction from a native Pulangiyan Binukid user. Interchanging the *si* and *hi* in some of them leads to odd sentences.

The other question was of a similar vein. Someone else noted that the *ba* and the *kuan* were the same words used in Ilongo and Bisaya. Her question though was to which part of speech these belong. Because she was not sure, she did not put check marks beside these words in her lists. Again, she did well to not raise a question about the meaning, for likewise these words do not have any real meaning by themselves. Rather, their meaning is in their use, which is to introduce a tone, a mood, or a quality. They are discourse particles, a species in the same genus as the case marker particles. The genus in turn thrives in abundance in Philippine languages.

Aside from indicating a hesitation or a temporary forgetting of some word, the *kuan* has a unique property. It can be subjected to the usual morphing by means of prefixes, suffixes, infixes, duplications. “*Kuan* was . . . *kuan*-ized at the . . . *kuan*” is the silly-sounding translation of an acceptable sentence in many Philippine languages. The sentence is perfectly understandable to a listener with whom a discourse context has already been established—that is, where speaker and listener already know or can assume they are talking about a certain person, dealing with some specific action done to that person, and referring to a specific location or event.

Together, the two questions suggest that the better students were already groping for something beyond vocabulary, possibly being drawn slightly into the realm of grammar, syntax, and discourse. They encountered a category of words which they could not easily handle using what they knew well from their English grammar classes. Happily, they also used them as language models they implicitly mastered from their general learning of Bisaya, Ilongo, and Pilipino.

There is something here which is underappreciated or unexamined. That is the third note.

III

Some things embedded in the recording could have been useful in the subsequent sessions of the course. A shift to first-person is best as I put down on paper a couple of them.

One concerns names. Sonny Boy Talasan mentioned his grandfather, Datu Mandublas. In 1993, I asked several Nabawang adults what his “real” name was. None of them denied me that datum—Celestino Ampildon—but nobody ever referred to or called him by that name. In a particularity that cannot be missed, I was also made to understand that it is not good to speak the full name or even just the first name of older relatives. Indeed, the culture socializes its young to a non-use and eventual forgetting of the first names of their elders.⁴ I had had to learn to distinguish between social settings when I could and when I should not ask young persons for the names of their parents.⁵

More important for my own further education, Sonny Boy Talasan’s incidental mention of “Datu Kunog-kunog” gives me a fourth name for his grandfather. It was in fact the first time that I have ever heard of it. When I commented so, the kibitzers during the recording all smiled. One pointed out that when a man becomes a datu, he is given another name. In Mandublas’s case, it was “Datu Kunog-kunog.” Many adults in the village apparently know it but rarely use it. Instead, Nabawang adults today use “Amay”—*amay* is the Pulangiyan word for father, *inay* for mother. He stands indeed at the head of by far the largest kin group in Nabawang today.

Thanks to another part of the same recording, there may be a fifth name for his grandfather. The “Man-iluyan” and “Nay-iluyan” in the recording certainly elicited an alertness question from me. My teachers in the village explained that when a man and a woman are wed, they are given new names. There is no shortage of illustrative examples they could give. So, when Celestino Ampildon and Angelina Loquindo were wed, they would have been given new names? Naturally! However, nobody in Nabawang today seems to recall what these were. Nobody knows what he was more commonly called during his bachelor days. Nobody in Nabawang today can name—by

whichever naming system—any of this datu’s siblings or cousins, if he had any at all, in whichever nearby or far away villages they may be found.

As in many other places in Southeast Asia, teknonymy is practiced by the Pulangiyan, specifically in connection with the eldest child. When Sonny Boy was given his name soon after his birth, his parents began being called “Man-Sonny-Boy” (or “Amay-Sonny-Boy”) and “Inay-Sonny-Boy” (or the shortened “Nay-Sonny-Boy”). Every other parent in Nabawang has some similar name; those who had a child by a formal remarriage receive additional such names. Over the course of many weekend visits to Nabawang since April of 2011, I have also heard “Papa-Sonny-Boy” and “Mama-Sonny-Boy” used to refer to or directly address Nestor and Susan. For his part, Celestino Ampildon became “Mandublas” when his eldest, a son, was given a name. The datu is also “Amay-Duglas” and how the “g” became a “b” is another story waiting to be told.

Sonny Boy’s use of “Man-iluyan” and “Nay-iluyan” is also interesting for the avoidance of the more commonly used “Man-Sonny-Boy” and “Inay-Sonny-Boy.” He and his siblings have never used these latter two terms in my hearing. Yet I have heard all eight siblings use the teknonyms for other parents in the community. The parallel situation I have observed in other children and youth with respect to their own parents and other parents in the community. I have heard mothers and fathers use teknonyms to address each other. Surely these are still facets of the actual use of Pulangiyan kinship-linked terms.

All of the above would seem so far removed from more critical and immediate concerns of the mission to the indigenous peoples. We Jesuits, however, know that the matter is part of seeking to find God already at work and at play in every part of creation, human languages and cultures included. In finding God, we praise and celebrate God, and pray we may be found worthy of the sharing in the suffering as well.

A second concerns culture contact and change. At the time of the recording, Sonny Boy was on a short leave from the Malaybalay Stock Farm so he could be in Nabawang. He had accepted to be the Commencement Speaker at the grade school graduation ceremonies in the neighboring village.

He had graduated from the same school. His teachers there were happy and proud of him, in part because he had a college degree.

Time was when Pulangiyeen elders did not look kindly at the idea of allowing their children to go to school. Back in 1993-1995, many older people in the territory—Datu Mandublas included—in fact expressed to me a generalized evaluation of schools being bad for their culture, destructive even. This, even if, on some other occasion, many also expressed they valued literacy. As best as I could make sense of the matter, it was not schools *per se* that the elders found problematic. Rather, going to school meant constant contact with the non-Pulangiyeen, in the process giving the young all sorts of ideas. One major underlying anathema was the challenge to the authority of elders and the accustomed ways, not in the least in connection with boy-girl relationships and control of marriages.

None of Datu Mandublas's generation ever went to elementary school, for there were no grade schools yet in the territory when they were little children. In time, the schools were set up. Within the childhood of his nine offsprings, the resistance to schooling must have begun to meltdown. At least two of the datu's older sons apparently never went to school. On the other hand, the three youngest apparently did. Of these three, only the youngest daughter, Susan, finished elementary school.

She went on to high school. That high school was about thirty kilometers away, at the center of the town to the south of Nabawang. It was set up by an Italian Jesuit missionary who, after so many tries, finally convinced Datu Mandublas to allow his youngest daughter to attend high school. The priest paid for her school fees and allowed her free board and lodging at the dormitory he built for the tribal students. For some reason or other, she stopped after a year. Even so, Susan is the first Nabawang native to have ever had some high school education.

Susan's children are part of the story. As of this writing, the youngest had just completed a year at the village pre-school. Susan and Nestor intend to send this youngest one to formal grade school this coming school year, no matter that the nearest school is about three kilometers away. Of the seven older children, the youngest two are still in grade school and one more in

high school. The parents also intend to keep these three in school for the coming school year.

The four oldest children have completed high school.⁶ All four have been to college. The fourth stopped after a year, primarily due to lack of funds; she went to Cagayan de Oro City to find a job but still hopes to resume her college in the near future. The second oldest is still in college, and the parents intend to let him continue this coming school year. The third eldest received a BS Education degree in March 2013. The eldest, Sonny Boy, had his BS Agriculture in March 2011. He is the first Nabawang resident ever to finish college.

Datu Mandublas died in 1996. He would be happy, I think, that despite nine years of schooling and then a job in overwhelmingly Bisaya-speaking communities, Sonny Boy considers himself to be *intaelæk ta Pulangiye*.

Notes

- 1 The free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) norm was followed. The main speaker readily agreed to be recorded. He and both his parents consented to the use of the recording in this writer's classes. After seeing the transcript and others like it, the three also consented for these to be used in any essay or book of this writer.
- 2 There is actually a fifth, although perhaps only a trained linguist could have picked it out or would have unhesitatingly classified it as an interjection.
- 3 To this writer's best knowledge, the *hi* never starts a sentence and hence is apparently syntax-linked.
- 4 From a study of the data available then, there might indeed be an advantage of such non-use especially in connection with Pulangiye marriage alliances. That will have to wait for another occasion.
- 5 In the light of that, Sonny Boy Talasan's reference to "Nestor" and "Susan" could not fail to elicit from me a comment. The implied question also did not fail to elicit the expected response and adjustment from both the older and the younger residents. What was noticeable and begs further probing via discreet inquiry is this: The younger ones seemed to take the cultural practice with a shrug.
- 6 If the side story be important for the record, three of these four children finished secondary education at the high school which is only about twelve kilometers away on foot. A Filipino Jesuit built that high school soon after the local parish was established. Still another Jesuit had a hand in the genesis of the village pre-school.

Book Reviews

Cartagenas, Aloysius L. 2012. *Unlocking the church's best kept secret: Principles for the interpretation, communication and praxis of Catholic social teaching*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 279 pages + xiv.

The peculiarity of any social teaching, Catholic, Protestant or otherwise, is that it is an unsteady marriage between the dogmatically permanent beliefs and the perennially changing historical contexts. Any authentic and relevant social teaching needs to mirror a two-fold fidelity: Faithfulness to the universal truths to which the social *teaching* is a reflection, and loyalty to the historical contexts to which the *social teaching* is inextricably embedded. The merit of Cartagenas's book *Unlocking the church's best kept secret* is that it epitomizes the wobbly balancing act that takes cognizance of this two-fold fidelity. There remains the affirmation that a Catholic social teaching maintains a "vital link with the gospel" (63), and yet recognizes that "every social document of the Church has its immediate situational reference" (25). As a teaching that is given birth in tradition and continues in the many transitions that this tradition undergoes (as the dictum *ecclesia semper reformanda* reiterates), the documents comprising the current Catholic social teaching need to be interpreted, communicated and brought into practice in the light of the Gospel promotion and defense of the flourishing of the human person. In the midst of this shifting union of the necessary and the contingent is the human person—who balances on the religious tightrope, trying not to fall either into the irrelevance of dogmatic faith or into the historicism of an agnostic stance regarding the relativity of truth. Beyond the dominant understanding of the social teaching as the "changing application of unchanging principles," Cartagenas reorients the theological discourse toward the human factor by highlighting the primacy of conscience. "While principles, criteria, and norms originate from the church's teaching office, their moral authority and consequent binding force needs to be determined ultimately by the impact they make on the moral conscience and imagination not only of Catholics but of other believers and non-believers as well" (83).

According to Cartagena, what used to be the church's "best kept secret" is a secret no more. In the last decades, there has been a surge of interests in the social teachings brought about by three developments in the universal church. Firstly, there is the shift of attention from papal teaching authority (for example, through encyclicals) to that of other bishops as college or national conference (for example, Synod of Bishop's *Justice in the world* or Consejo Episcopala Latino Americano [CELAM] in Medellin, Columbia). Secondly, there is the recognition that the social teaching is no longer immune from criticism neither is it unchanging, comprehensive and complete. Rather, it is now validated as a moral discourse among many other humanistic and religious discourses in the public sphere. This brings us to the third development, that is, the social teaching needs to engage in collaboration with other disciplines, particularly with the social and natural sciences, not only with theology and philosophy. These developments steer the social teaching "in a period of a transition, one that is fraught with ambiguities, but nonetheless ripe with new possibilities" (5).

It is in view of this period of transition that the author aims to write the book. Despite the ambiguities attendant to the transition, new possibilities need to be realized. The realization of these come when we sufficiently respond to the challenges of "interpretation, communication, and practice" of the social teachings of the church. These three constitute the structural frame of the whole book. The challenge of *interpretation* affirms that the social teaching is a discourse fixed into writing. In this way, the social message locates itself not in the act of hearing, but in the act of (re-)reading. As a written discourse, the social teaching is tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive. As a text, it becomes subject to a "community of readers and re-readers" hence integrating the text into a "chain of readings" that gives birth to tradition. According to Cartagena, "the repeated reinterpretation of magisterial texts ultimately facilitates the evolution of what can rightly be called a one 'Catholic social tradition'" (38). A tradition that is given birth in a "chain of readings" had to engage in a process of *communication*. The social teaching of the church is a "tradition of communication," addressing the peoples of every age, nation and circumstance in order to uphold human dignity in the light of the gospel. However, this tradition has a "collaborative destiny" (85ff) which is achieved only when it works in partnership with the social and natural sciences, along with the traditional ecclesiastical disciplines (in short when collaboration becomes multidisciplinary). Such "collaborative destiny" is achieved when the social tradition affirms the ethical demand on human conscience, when there is reciprocity between the pope and his colleagues in the Episcopal College, and when there is a genuine recognition of the *sensus fidelium* of the local church bringing to fruition the church's social concern as a mirroring of its Catholic (that is, all-embracing) patrimony. Beyond interpretation and communication, the tradition of social teaching has to be praxis-

oriented or needs to be reframed in terms of a theory of *practice*. This is not simply a set of technical skills or just any human activity. Rather, practice is “a moral entity whereby its creators are at once the embodiment of standards and virtues” whose actions are oriented to the achievement of goods internal to the practice, and hence not an individual possession, but a genuine common good that contributes to the flourishing of human life (121-22). Cartagenas suggests that praxis is the *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* of the church’s social tradition. Diverging from the commonly held view that there is an “antecedent-consequential” model at work in the social teachings of the church—that is, theory (orthodoxy) is understood as cause, while practice (orthopraxy) is an effect—the author insists that the relation of the two is not a one-way street. “Praxis,” Cartagenas argues, “is not only a goal, but above all else the starting point of theory” (176). This is the core of a reframing of the church’s social teaching into a “praxis-reflective” type of tradition.

By way of conclusion, the author highlights the one Catholic social tradition which “is neither in its twilight nor renaissance” (191), but is in transition which will not open to a new future unless we face the challenge of interpretation, communication, and practice which the author identifies as the pathways for a tradition in transition.

It does not take long for a reader to realize that the work is a fruit of many years of research and reflection (the main ideas in the book have their beginnings in the author’s doctoral dissertation defended at the Theology Faculty of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in 1996). Other than the scholarship that the work exemplifies, there are important points one can highlight. Firstly, the work manifests the beautiful and critical collaborative relation between philosophy and theology. Beyond the view that philosophy is an *ancilla theologiae*, the work lays bare the fruitful critical contribution that philosophy can make to theological discourses as a partner in dialogue, viz., Paul Ricoeur (hermeneutic theory of text) for the pathway of interpretation, Jürgen Habermas (critical theory of communicative reason and action) for the pathway of communication, and Alasdair MacIntyre (theory of practice) for the pathway of praxis. Through these critical personae, Cartagenas was able to disclose certain interpretative challenges, communicative deficiencies, and variegated practical incoherences in the church’s social teaching. Secondly, in view of the recently published *Compendium of the social doctrine of the church* (2004), Cartagenas takes issue with the idea that the key to the future of the Catholic social teaching is not in the presentation of its complete and systematic overview through the *Compendium*. He contends that its future “hinges less on an official *Compendium* than on the task of sufficiently responding to [a] host of challenges” (4) namely: Of critically reading the tradition itself, of dialoguing with other humanistic and religious traditions of social practice, and of being sensitive to the issue of multiculturalism, especially in Asia where Christianity is a minority.

Thirdly, like any good manual of moral theology, at the end of each part, the author provides a set of principles (comprising chapters three, six and nine), which not only highlights important insights from the previous discussions but also invites the reader to further reflection and appropriation. Fourthly, the author theologizes from a liberationist viewpoint, critical of the prevailing theological methods, seriously seeking to recuperate the broader meaning of Catholic (that is, all-embracing). Fifthly, the Catholic social tradition needs to relocate itself from state or political society to the domain of civil society in both national and global levels (177-82). Sixthly and perhaps most importantly, mirroring the Plenary Council of the Philippines (PCP) II's "preferential option for the poor," the author highlights the "mark of sacramentality." That is to say, Christian social practice must be a "sign and instrument to bring about a real foretaste of the fullness of justice and transformation promised by God" especially for the poor (207). Relevant here is the reappropriation of the poor not as objects of someone's "option for" but as *genuine subjects*. Cartagena defines "morality of means" precisely in such terms: "How authoritative the subjectivity of the poor will be in the conversation that determines the appropriate structures, how their experience of human suffering and exclusion is appreciated as its starting point, and how their transformative praxis is validated as genuinely Christian" (210).

However, like all works, the book does encounter certain limitations. Firstly, the book presents principles for the interpretation, communication and praxis of Catholic social teaching but it does not venture into a systematic exposition of the social teaching of the church itself (something to which the *Compendium* may come in handy). Because it does not intend to replace the reading of the documents of the Catholic social tradition (as it should!), a reader may well benefit more from this book if he or she has read or at least has general knowledge of the encyclicals and other documents that constitute the Catholic social teaching. Secondly, although the author underscores the growing significance of the teaching authority of the college of bishops alongside that of the pope, other than a single reference (211), the book seems to have turned a blind eye to crucial social documents of the Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences (FABC). Since 1970, FABC has been publishing social documents of significance that addressed a host of social concerns especially in the uniquely Asian context. This appears to be a major deficiency in the light of the author's own insistence on "the pre-eminence of contexts" in the critical reflection of social praxis (186). Regardless of these limitations, the book remains a must-read for any Catholic scholar or person engaged in social action who aims to have a critical knowledge of the Catholic social tradition. In reading this book, each page becomes a promising journey of understanding what it means "to act justly, love tenderly and walk humbly with God" (Micah 6:8). The Philippine church is blessed to have a native theologian who knows how to take a critical distance and authentic assent

to the faith, and who seriously advances PCP II's preferential option for the poor. In his words: "The time has come, I believe, for the social magisterium to sit down with the current social carriers of the Catholic social tradition (that is, the poor) and, through the process of common reflection and discernment, explore together for new and much better ways of becoming not just a church for the poor, but above all, a church *of* the poor" (214-15).

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Alunan, Merlie M. 2012. *Pagdakop sa bulalakaw ug uban pang mga balak.* Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 154 pages.

Sa gamay pa ko, kanunay ko makakitag bulalakaw nga kalit lang mosutoy gikan sa kawanangan padulong ambot asa sa kalibotan. Diha pa mi nagpuyo sa Quezon Boulevard, sa may Salmonan banda. Katunggan pa ang maong lugar kaniadto, daghang bakhaw ug waterlili, gurami ug puyo, hasta tangkig. Sa gabii kalingawan namong mga bata nga magdulag biros, tigso, ug tubig-tubig. Tingali tungod kay kanunay ko naa sa gawas sa balay sa gabii mao nga kanunay sab ko makakitag bulalakaw. Apan naa koy mahinumdoman nga usa ka dako ug siga kaayo nga bulalakaw nga mihiwa sa kangitngit ibabaw sa Isla sa Samal. Nakahinumdom ko niini kay morag duol kaayo ang bulalakaw ug dugay napalong ang iyang pagdilaab. Nakahinumdom ko nga mihunong sa pagdula ug gitutokan ang paglupad niini hangtod nga nahanaw.

Sulod sa dugayng panahon, wala koy mahinumdoman nga nakakita kog bulalakaw. Basin naa, pero walay midulot sa akong panumdoman. Busa *memorable* kaayo alang nako dihang nakakita na sab kog bulalakaw nga sama kadako ug kahayag sa nakita nako sa Boulevard. Didto pa gyod ni nahitabo sa Cambodia mga napulo ka tuig na ang milabay. Kauban nako ang mga amigong Pinoy nga naglingkod sa balkonahe sa usa ka *hotel* dihang mibutho ang bulalakaw. Dugay napalong ang siga niini. Napatunganga gyod ko sa kalipay tungod sa kaanindot niini.

Ang kinaulahiing bulalakaw nga akong nakita nahitabo sa Cebu dihang gitigayon ang *Taboan Writers Festival* niadtong Pebrero 2010. Nag-inom-inom ming mga manunulat sa balkonahe sa usa ka *hotel* dihang nakita namo ang bulalakaw nga misutoy og tidlom sa kalibotan. Hinuon dili ni sama kadako o kahayag sa akong nakita sa Boulevard ug Cambodia. Pero, nalipay lang gihapon

ko. Intawon sab no, kon dili ko maglulungkod sa balkonahe sa *hotel* sa gabii, dili gyod ko kakitag bulalakaw.

Kaniadto, dako kaayong misteryo alang nako kon unsa ug hain gikan ang mga bulalakaw ug kon asa sila padulong diris kalibotan. Karon, dili lang kay nasayod na ko kon unsa ug hain sila gikan, kondili labaw sa tanan, nasayod usab ako kon unsay destinasyon nila diris kalibotan. Aw, tingali dili tanang bulalakaw, pipila lang. Kahibalo ba mo unsay mahitabo sa mga bulalakaw nga masaag sa atong kalibotan? Sa motuo mog dili, ang pipila kanila madakpan ug himoong binuhi sa mga magbabalak.

Karong bag-o lang gyod ko nasayod niina. Bantog ra naay mga magbabalak nga labihang makagagahom sa pulong! Matingala ka gyod nganong makahulma silag mga pulong ngadto sa mga balak nga molingaw ug motandog nimo. Diay kay gihuptan nila ang mahika sa pulong nga ilang nakuha sa bulalakaw nga ilang nadakpan. Palaran kaayo ta karong adlaw kay personal natong makahimamat kining magbabalak nga adunay binuhing bulalakaw. Walay lain kondili si Merlie.

Taodtaod na kong nakaila kang Merlie isip usa sa nag-unang magbabalak sa iningles sa nasod, kansang mga balak gideskrayb sa usa ka kritiko nga limpiyo kaayo pagkagama. Ang matag pulong kuno sa iyang balak haom gayod sa balak. Kon sa *mosaic painting* pa, ang matag pulong morag bato nga sakto gayod sa pagtibuok sa larawan. Walay labis, walay kulang. Sa laktod, ang matag balak *perfect*. Ug tuod man, sa pipila ka balak nga iningles ni Merlie nga akong nabasa, mahingangha gyod ko sa kainsakto sa mga pulong nga iyang gigamit. Niay sampol nga berso gikan sa “Mountain in her feet:”

*The mountains teach a wordless/ syllabary of wind, leaves, starlight,/darkness,
the thud of timber falling/ to its doom, the blind bat screeching,/ the owl
mapping the forest by scent/ or by sound with their wise wings/*

Pagkanindot paminawon. Ug niadto pa, dako na kong *fan* ni Merlie. Unya karon, kalit lang siya mipagula og usa ka libro sa mga balak sa dilang Binisaya?! Naunhan pa gyod ko nga usa ka Bisayista kuno! Ug dihang akong gibasa ang iyang libro, misamot ang akong kahingangha. Paminawa ning unang estansa sa “Witik-witik sa hangin:”

*Hangin maoy nagbuhi kanato/ hangin sa atong ginhawaan/ sa atong kaugatan/
sa atong utokan/ mopadagayday sa dugo/ sa pagbati sa damgo/ mopamala sa
luha/ mopaluag sa nagyukot-yukot/ ug di masabtan nga tanghaga/*

Kalami sa awit sa mga pulong. Apan dili lamang kana ang imong makuha sa libro ni Merlie. Kining libro wala lamang magpakita sa iyang katakos sa pagpanalsal sa mga pulong, iyang gipakita dinhi ang iyang gahom sa paghatag og tingog sa nagkadaiyang mga tawo, gikan sa labing mayukmok ngadto sa mga diwata, gikan sa karaang panahon ngadto sa umaabot. Mabati nimo dinhi ang mga tingog sa mga

biktima sa Balangiga Massacre ug sa Ampatuan Massacre ug mahingangha ka kon giunsa ni Merlie pagtagik sa mga pulong aron kining mga trahedy sa atong nasod mahimong mga balak. Paminawa ning “Bahad ni Antoy:”

Sa pantaw sa ilang balay/ tua si Antoy nagtikungkong/ nagbaid sa iyang pinuti/ Sa kada hapuyod sa pinohan/ moyamyam, magadaghong/
*Usa para kang Talya/ nga gikuhit ni Beneton sa abaga./ Usa para kang Petral
 nga gihuboon s' patadyong/ ni Wynton. Ug usa pod paral sa bag-ong dalaga
 ni Manang Iskal nga pugos gigakos/ sa mga 'Mirkanong hubog/ sa tabo sa
 Musong-busong/ sa miaging Martes.*

Dili lamang usa ka banggiitang magbabalak si Merlie. Usa siya ka balyan kansang gahom sa pulong iyang gigamit sa pagsungog sa atong galamhan ug pagpukaw sa atong panumdoman aron kita dili makalimot sa atong nangagi isip usa ka katawhan ug nasod. Ug alang nako, usa siya sa adunay katungod sa talagsaong bansag nga magbabalak sa katawhan. Ug nasayod na ta kon asa gikan ang iyang gahom sa pulong. Nakadakop siyag bulalakaw. Ang bulalakaw maoy naghatag kaniya sa mga balak. Ang bulalakaw balak. Ug si Merlie mao ang buhing balak.

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Kaelin, Lukas. 2012. *Strong family, weak state: Hegel's political philosophy and the Filipino family*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 236 pages.

Lukas Kaelin is a Swiss philosopher and a Research Fellow at the Institute for Ethics and Law in Medicine at the University of Vienna. But he served for two years, from 2006 to 2008, as an Assistant Professor at the Philosophy Department of the Ateneo de Manila University, where he taught political philosophy. The book is partly a result of his engagement as a teacher of political philosophy here in the Philippines. He considers the book as a study by a foreigner of the Filipino society, but mindful of the foreign biases or limitations that he may have in studying one of the objects of his study in this book, the Filipino family.

The book is mainly composed of five chapters, excluding the preface and a glossary of Hegelian terms. The book is not only a study of the Filipino society but also an exposition of the social and political philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. The first chapter, however, is an exposition of some modern political philosophers' treatment of the family in their political philosophies. It argues that the social

contract theorists, the modern political philosophers, have a marginalized treatment of the family in their political theories; they were unlike Hegel, who had a more extensive treatment of the topic and considered the family to have an important role in his political philosophy. The second chapter is an exposition of Hegel's political philosophy in relation to his dialectical system of *thesis*, *antithesis* and *synthesis*. The third chapter is a study of the role and dynamics of the family in the Filipino society using the works of Alfred McCoy, F. Landa Jocano on Filipino family and society, and other social science studies of the Filipino family and society. The fourth chapter is a comparative analysis of Hegel's political theory of the family and the idea of the Filipino family gathered from the social science studies. Kaelin provides seven points of comparison. The last chapter deals with the critical possibilities of Hegelian theory of state in Filipino society and their dialectical relationship, that is, how theory and practice help develop each other.

The book points out the divergent concepts of the family in Hegel's political philosophy and Filipino society. The former is nuclear, while the latter is extensive and plays a great role in Filipino society and politics. In Hegel, the family is the opposite of the civil society, and the state plays a mediating role. In Filipino society, the family is the opposite of the state, and the civil society plays a mediating role. But despite this difference, he tries to present a possible way of harmonizing them by pointing out how a Hegelian theory of state may help reconstruct the institutions present in Filipino society to help it become a better society, and at the same time, how the dynamics in Filipino society may help improve the understanding of Hegel's political and social philosophy. For instance, the author points out that the discourse on the concept of the "state" among the Filipinos is not as important compared to Hegel's or the Western societies,' but instead, in the Philippines the discourse is directed to the concept of the "nation." He suggests in the book the possibility of how Hegel's insights into the importance of the state may help in the nation building of the Filipinos—the state as something that shapes consciousness and life.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of Hegel's language, the book is a readable one; it does not speak in a very technical way. As such, it would be easy for non-technical readers to peruse the book. The way the chapters are ordered also makes it easy for readers to follow the points or arguments the author wants to convey. The book is, therefore, better read as a whole instead of by chapters. Nevertheless, a reader would find it better to read the first three chapters separately because these chapters deal with separate important topics that will serve as premises for the author's points and arguments. The last two chapters, however, cannot be read separately from the rest since they are founded on the understanding of the points or premises established by, at least, the second and the third chapters.

Students of political philosophy and Hegel, or those who just want to understand the works of Hegel, may find the book useful. It explains important Hegelian philosophical terms. For instance, terms such as “spirit” and the process of *Aufhebung*, which he translates as “sublation” is comprehensively explained. He also provides for an understanding of some important concepts in political theory, such as civil society, a concept that is commonly used in our country today but is not clearly understood. The reader would find out the various meanings of the term civil society in Hegel’s philosophy and how we understand it in the Philippine context. The book is, therefore, a good introduction to Hegel’s philosophy and political philosophy.

Students of Filipino society may also find good use of the book as it provides new and good insights into the Filipino family and society. It does not only provide an account of the Filipino family but also presents a European or Western, in this case, most likely German, concept of the family. It therefore offers a comparative concept of the family, and not just a one-sided analysis of the Filipino family, which is what we are more familiar with given that we have an abundance of literature on this. Basically, he points out that the Western concept of the family has less political and economic power compared to the Filipino concept of the family. The latter extends its influence not only in politics and economics but also in religion, as many of the religious celebrations, such as *fiestas*, are seen as events where Filipino families try to also compete with one another to showcase their family wealth. The limitation of the study, however, is that the European concept of the family presented in this book is a philosophical concept and is not coming from social science studies of the Western family, unlike how the author dealt with the concept of the Filipino family.

The book is highly recommended for students of political philosophy, especially Hegel, in the undergraduate and the graduate levels. It is a good secondary source or an introduction to a difficult philosophical tradition like Hegel’s philosophy. It gives students a good example of a good philosophical study; it provides a possible way of studying academic philosophy. Researchers in philosophy, social sciences and the Filipino society may also find the book a useful reference because it suggests possible further research directions.

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Haught, John F. 2007. *God after Darwin: A theology of evolution*, 2nd ed. Colorado: Westview Press. 256 pages.

In *God after Darwin*, John Haught shows that a serious theological engagement with evolutionary science proves to be more fruitful than the theological responses of opposition and separatism. He argues not only for the compatibility of evolution with God but also for Darwinian science as a great gift to theology. In the age of evolution, theology has to come up with a truly responsive evolutionary theology, one that respects both the integrity of science and theology. By drawing on works coming from various sources, such as sciences, philosophy (metaphysics and epistemology), theology, religious thought (Taoism), scriptures, including human experiences, Haught, who is a theologian himself, comes up with a theology of evolution the facets of which he sets forth in his book. His ideas in *God after Darwin*, though incorporating nuances of evolutionary thought, are still faithful to authoritative scriptural and traditional sources of faith.

Haught argues that scientific materialism and the Intelligent Design (ID) theory are incapable of explaining fully the evolutionary process, as both are neglecting a very important feature of the evolutionary process—the emergence of novelty. There is the need thus to seek for an alternative to these two unacceptable positions. This search requires examining closely Darwin's religiously dangerous ideas that have rendered deathblows to religion and its benign and designing deity.

The first dangerous idea is the natural selection theory which suggests an impersonal universe not governed by a divine providential intelligence or tended by divine compassion. To respond to this, Haught proposes that evolutionary data be seen in the light of the biblical image of a self-emptying God, who in loving humility renounces any claim to domineering omnipotence. It is precisely this loving self-restraint that allows the world's self-creation and self-ordering. Thus for the cosmos to evolve into a relatively autonomous reality distinct from its creator, unfolding itself at its own time and pace, God concedes to it its own autonomous principles of operation—impersonal laws of gravity and natural selection, and self-organization. Creation and its evolutionary unfolding, hence, are the consequences of God's humble and loving "letting" be rather than an "eternal plan." Moreover, the God of kenotic love pours out into creation the very substance of the divine life by way of offering to it a range of new possibilities. This is how God's power is effectively at work in the cosmos: His invitation to unfold its creative potential spontaneously from within. Moreover, a relatively autonomous creation is necessarily contingent. This contingency entails the possibility of suffering. Imperfection and pain will always be part of a universe still in the process of being created. Yet, all of the sufferings, struggles, and achievements of the evolving world are not outside of God's care. God redeems them from all loss and gives eternal meaning to everything.

Haught considers such theological interpretation as faithful to a religious tradition and ultimately provides an explanation to evolution. Furthermore, this metaphysics of divine humility makes more sense of the evolutionary process than of the materialist metaphysics or the ID theory.

The second dangerous idea of Darwin is the vision of life's continuum, which renders unbelievable the traditional idea of nature as a sacred hierarchy overseen and permeated by an ultimate source of meaning. It is now lifeless and mindless matter that has become the metaphysical and historical source (*arche*) of all beings, not the sacred. Science's dissolution of the sacred hierarchy has nihilistic consequences.

Haught argues that this hierarchical ordering is not destroyed by evolution. He is helped by a new scientific discovery—information. The nonenergetic and nonmassive information works by *comprehensively* integrating particulars into coherent wholes without violating “lower-level” laws of chemistry and physics, thus, allowing for distinct kinds of beings and grades of values which appear to evolution as an unbroken material and historical continuum. By giving it a Taoist interpretation, Haught shows that information can pattern the universe, and endow it with hierarchically distinct features in a noninvasive, utterly humble manner. The kenotic God of the Christian faith works in the way of humble self-restraint rather than coercive intervention.

However, the static and vertical representations of the “Great Chain of Being” (GCB) needs radical transformation. The classical hierarchy pictures the fullness of being and truth as residing in a timeless realm up above or in the mythic past. This metaphysics of the ‘eternal present’ or the ‘metaphysics of the past’ does not consider cosmic time as bringing anything new, thus, evolution which requires the passage of time would appear essentially pointless. Likewise, evolutionary materialism, following the metaphysics of the past, does not allow for the emergence of real novelty in evolution.

Haught argues for the “metaphysics of the future,” which sees all things as receiving their being not from the mythic past or the eternal present above but from out of an inexhaustibly resourceful “future”—the arena into which God “withdraws” to allow for the autonomous self-creation of evolution. This view of reality, which is commensurate with the evidence provided by evolutionary novelty, is grounded in religious experience and in biblical faith. God as the Absolute Future is a biblical notion rooted in the overwhelming experience of biblical ancestors of the “power of the future,” wherein the normal course of events is interrupted by an unpredictable and surprising future. The same power of the future that grasps them in faith also embraces the entire cosmos. Haught thus proposes that the power of the future be the ultimate metaphysical explanation of evolution. Thus, whatever the immediate causes and mechanisms that are operative in the Darwinian process may be, the ultimate explanation of evolution is God.

How does the divine interaction with the cosmos influence the process of evolution in which there emerges life and mind out of lifeless and “mindless” matter? To answer this question and to ground these concepts as vital to his proposed evolutionary theology, Haught brings into rational discourse the thoughts of Whitehead, Jonas, Polanyi and De Chardin.

Whitehead, Jonas and Polanyi argue for subjectivity entering into the cosmos. Yet Jonas and Polanyi do not want to extend subjectivity down the realm of living beings as Whitehead does. They insist on a sharp ontological discontinuity, which the materialist cannot see and which implies something that the process perspective loses sight of—that is, the hierarchical structuring of the cosmos.

Jonas, however, attributes to matter a potential for mind, a yearning that leads in the direction of inwardness. For him there is no *logos* in the early cosmos, only a cosmogonic *eros*. Yet this “potentiality” for inwardness is insufficient and leaves enormous explanatory gap. Haught rebuts Jonas through De Chardin and Whitehead. De Chardin, like Whitehead, argues that there is a subjective element, a “withinness” that corresponds by degrees to the outward complexity of all beings. At no point in its evolution can the cosmos be spiritless or devoid of “withinness.” Thus, the physical universe has been receptive and responsive to the presence of God from the very earliest moments of the cosmic process. Moreover, Jonas’s distinction between *eros* and *logos* is problematic. Nature from the beginning must have been *patterned* in a way that would distinguish it conceptually from sheer chaos. It must always have corresponded to some kind of *logos* as well. The *logos* is similar to Whitehead’s relevant evolutionary possibilities residing eternally in God. Summing up, God acts unobtrusively yet powerfully by offering to cosmos a range of new possibilities; and nature is responsive to the divine action for it has within it a subjectivity, a “withinness” in varying degrees.

Evolutionary theology prefers to think of God’s plan not as a blueprint but a vision of what the cosmos might become. The cosmos, after Darwin, is not a design but a promise of an unimaginable future fulfillment. For God, the source of both *logos* and *eros*, of order and novelty, is not only an Alpha but also an Omega, the Absolute Future, who is the infinitely liberating source of new possibilities and new life. He is not a designer or a planner who has mapped out the world in every detail but the God of kenotic love who keeps on pouring himself into creation and constantly nourishing it by its offer of relevant new possibilities. He is also a God of compassion who enfolds redemptively and preserves each moment of the cosmic evolutionary story. Nothing is lost. Thus, “hope always springs eternal” as we move toward the future even in the midst of destruction and chaos, and even in the face of impending cosmic death. With this, Haught contends that to attend to God’s “Word” (*Logos*) is to always open our lives in hope to a fresh and surprising future.

Haught also considers the implications of evolutionary theology to ecology and morality. As the divine promise of redemption extends to the whole of creation, nature from the perspective of eschatological faith is a promise. It carries in it the seed of a splendid future perfection. That nature will ultimately not be destroyed but transfigured together with humanity is not simply spiritually uplifting, but spiritually explosive, and a powerful antidote to the cosmic pessimism of science. This orients humanity in hope toward a glorious future with nature, and at the same time, toward care for nature in the present: It is a caring one gives to a promise. This view of nature as a promise overcomes the dualism of Western thought and negates the anti-nature spiritualism of Western Christianity. It, moreover, provides a firm grounding for ecological concerns.

In grounding morality with the evolutionary process, Haught is helped by Whitehead's Aesthetic Cosmological Principle which suggests that from the very beginning the universe's impetus is toward the intensification and expansion of beauty. The shape that beauty takes in the emergent cosmos is that of community—any complex entity consisting of unity and plurality, order and novelty, or contrast and harmony. Moral life contributes to this ongoing composition of beauty not only by a life of virtues but also by creating communities capable of integrating plurality of contrasting constituents. This evolutionary ethics of Haught has invigorating implications. It implies that interreligious and intercultural dialogues and other moral endeavors, including even the most insignificant everyday acts, as long as these contribute to the inclusion of the excluded and to sustaining or developing communities, which are all vehicles of ongoing evolution. Moral life, thus, becomes more deeply meaningful and an exciting adventure of an incessant creation, of a more intense and expansive beauty.

The breadth and scope of the book is quite remarkable. To come up with his evolutionary theology, Haught makes a brilliant synthesis of different thoughts ranging from the ancient and classical to contemporary, and by thinkers of diverse fields of knowledge. He proceeds by way of a rational discourse and dialectics, and writes in such a way that topics difficult to comprehend are easily understood. The book though is thought-provoking and requires and rightly deserves careful reading. Moreover, the book's all-encompassing subject matter and the richness and profundity of its insights demand that one has to take time pondering on its novel and invigorating ideas.

Haught has overturned classical religious teachings by radically interpreting these in terms of the Darwinian concept. But his interpretations cannot be considered heretical for in trying to make sense of Darwinian evolution, he goes back to the fundamental features of biblical faith—the religious experience of God as a self-emptying love and as a promise. He finds in these images of God intelligibility to evolution. Yet such images of God given in religious experience have been ignored

by theologians. Their focus is on the abstract representation of the deity as an 'intelligent designer.' This way of thinking results from centuries of domination of the metaphysics of being and 'eternal present' of Greek thought. So what Haught has successfully done is to make contemporary Christian thought and spirituality go back to its roots—the fundamentals of biblical faith, and consequently, of Christian faith. He not only enhances and enriches traditional teachings about God and God's way of acting in the world by Darwinian vision, but also liberates Christian thought from the stale and imprisoning metaphysics of Greek thought. This is made possible by the encounter of theology with Darwinian evolution. Darwin's dangerous ideas, thus, are truly a gift to theology.

One minor detail though has to be pointed out. The metaphysics of *esse* criticized by Haught cannot be equated with the metaphysics of being in Greek thought, a metaphysics which grounds itself on the concept of being by Plato—the perfect, immutable, and timeless essences or forms. It is more appropriate to call this type of metaphysics as not the metaphysics of *esse* but a 'metaphysics of essence,' or a metaphysics of being minus *esse*. *Esse*, which is at the core of existential Thomistic metaphysics, is the dynamic act of existence responsible for the dynamic presencing of beings. As there is nothing outside of existence, there is also nothing outside of *esse ipsum subsistens*. The ultimate reality, thus, is not an immutable perfect being outside of time and of the contingent evolving universe, but a presence in the depths of every reality, sustaining it from within and carrying it through as it self-transcends and moves toward its own greater fulfillment. God as loving presence accompanies the evolving universe in its cosmic adventure, beefing it up from *within* by giving to it, at the critical phases of its journey, additional 'inputs' or 'information.' Evolving reality, thus, can radically self-transcend that a new being has come about, and giving rise to a dynamic hierarchical structuring of reality. That God is a hidden Presence in the depth of reality explains why the evolving cosmos experiences the 'lure of possibilities' not from without but from within. It, therefore, does not conflict with Haught's metaphysics but complements and, perhaps, completes it. Our image of God, thus, is not simply as the Alpha and the Omega, the Source and the Future, but also a Presence.

With his radical way of understanding nature, religion and morality, Haught has also provided us a new vision of religion, and of living the moral life and Christian faith, a vision which is more life-giving and consciousness-expanding, as well as filling the human person with hope and inspiring and energizing him/her to participate in the cosmic creativity. That beauty is the standard of morality (a novel idea, though Aristotle has already said that the good is beautiful) challenges the human person to go beyond the limited conceptions of the moral good. Such spurs one all the more to a creative adventure of always going beyond the 'frontiers' in search of a greater and more intense beauty. This is what Christian life is all about. The book hence

BOOK REVIEWS

is a recommended reading not only for those interested in reconciling religion and evolutionary science, or those engaged in ecological movements and in actions that make possible the formation of communities of diverse constituents, but also for those still looking for a firm grounding of their engagements. It is recommended most especially for the Christian who is seriously seeking for a new way of living an authentic Christian faith in the age of evolution.

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TAMBARA 30 (JUNE 2013)

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TAMBARA

When the *balatik* appears in the sky, it is time for the yearly sacrifice. All who are to prepare new fields or are to assist others in such work gather to take part in the ceremonies honoring the spirits. For three days the men abstain from work. No music and dancing are allowed.

With the ending of the period of taboo, the workers go the fields and in the center of each, they place a *tambara*, a white dish containing betel nut. This is an offering to Eugpamolak Manobo, besought to drive away evil spirits, keep the workers in good health, allow an abundant crop, and make the owners rich and happy.

Fay Cooper Cole

This journal has borrowed the Bagobo word *tambara* to emphasize the commitment of the Ateneo de Davao University to serve the Ateneo Community and the larger Mindanao region as a Filipino, Catholic and Jesuit University.