Stuart A.Schlegel Wisdom from a Rainforest: The Spiritual Journey of An Anthropologist
Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. ISBN 971-550-306-3. 288 pages. The first time I read the first few pages of Wisdom from a Rainforest by Stuart Schlegel, I fell in love with the book. I was writing an annotated bibliography of Mindanao Studies and I did not want to put the book down. I wanted to finish reading it up to the last page. But I did not have the luxury of time back then, so I had to be content with scanning and skimming the pages of the book. What lingered in my memory, though, was how scholarly the book was despite its personal tone. I saw Wisdom from a Rainforest again while browsing in the library of the University of the Philippines (UP) Mindanao Studies Section one afternoon. I pored over the first few pages, my memory getting refreshed about the battle to save the life of the author’s young son, Len, who was seriously sick. Len had to be brought to Lebak to get medical attention, and the author related how the forest Tedurays of Figel, Sultan Kudarat, risked their life and limb in crossing the swollen Dakel Tran River to save his son. [1] What also became vivid to me was the pain that Schlegel, who had returned to America, felt upon hearing the news of the massacre of the Figel Tedurays one day in February of 1972. I deeply sympathized with the tragedy that befell the forest Tedurays. I remember crying when I read this section of the book. [2] This ‘romance’ with Wisdom from a Rainforest did not end the second time. I borrowed the book again and this time my reading focused on Teduray culture. I was particularly drawn to the chapter about the mentefuwaley libun (roughly translated into English by the author as “one-who-became-a-woman”). Chapter 9 of the book discusses Uka, the mentefuwaley libun, the finest bamboo zither player among the Tedurays. [3]
In Schlegel’s (1999) words,
This willingness to let people decide on their own gender took me completely by surprise. The whole notion that gender is a matter of social and cultural definition and not a biologically given fact began to be considered and discussed by feminist anthropologists in the mid 1970s… (140)
He further explains
It is now clear that in every society being “male” and “female” is a question of who is understood to be what and for what reason-a piece of a given society’s take on reality-rather than a straightforward question of anatomy (140).
When I embarked on writing this book review, I really did not know how to proceed. I thought I could not make a critical review of something that I fell in love with on first reading. Can a rave be a review? Initially, I wanted to get the wisdom from each chapter, but I resolved that I did not want to do just an enumeration. Fortunately, Schlegel (1999, 68) himself provided the guide. He made a succinct articulation of what post-modernists refer to as positionality or subjectivity. To ground his readers, he writes, “The most I want to claim for what I saw, and for what I am telling you in this book, is that it is my best ‘take’ of their ‘take.’” Following his example, I have examined my subject position, my “take,” where I am coming from as I write this review. Well, I have a confession to make: I have a long-standing affair with gender identity and sexuality, epistemologically. It’s political and personal as well. (For feminists, the dichotomy is blurred.) When I’m presented with something, it’s almost instinctual to use the feminist lens. Here then is my “take” of Wisdom from a Rainforest. Mentefuwaley Libun: Transgender, Performativity, Sacred Sexuality I would like to examine more extensively this ethnographic detail about the mentefuwaley libun. Seemingly, it is easy to categorize the mentefuwaley libun as simply transgender. As defined:
Transgender is a broad term that applies to people who live all or substantial portions of their lives expressing an innate sense of gender other than their birth sex. This includes transsexuals, cross-dressers and people who simply feel like their biological sex fails to reflect their true gender. [4] But apparently, to do so may be over simplistic and naïve. After all, theories, which may render a more nuanced explanation about this, exist. I am appropriating Judith Butler’s gender performativity to give this phenomenon a fresh reading. In her book Gender Trouble, Butler (1990) asserts that it is not just gender that is a social and cultural construction but sex or the body, as well. She explains:
If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called sex is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender… (quoted in Moi 1999, 46).
This assertion by Butler is best captured in the dialogue that transpired between a forest Teduray and Schlegel when the latter was grappling with his experience of the mentefuwaley libun. And I quote,
Schlegel: “Oh, she is really a man?”
Forest Teduray: “No,” he said, “she is a genuine woman!”
Schlegel: “Well, then, when she was born was she a boy or a girl?”
Forest Teduray: “She was born a boy…Don’t you remember? I just said that she is one-who-became-a-woman!”
Schlegel: “She is really a man, just dressed like a woman!”
Forest Teduray: “Can’t you understand? She is really a woman! She is one-who-became-a-woman.”
Schlegel: “Well, does she have a penis?”
Forest Teduray: “Yes, of course she has a penis… She is one-who-became-a-woman.”
In the 1970s, feminist theorizing reached a climax with its definitive distinction: sex is biological and gender is a social and cultural construction. This binarism became like a mantra to differentiate man and woman, masculine and feminine. More importantly, the arguments for biological determinism i.e., “anatomy is destiny,” were theoretically challenged and rendered almost practically archaic.
Among the forest Tedurays, even if one is born a boy, i.e., with a penis, he can choose to become a woman. The mentefuwaley libun is perceived as one-who-became-a-woman, and proves that, practically, anatomy is not destiny. In considering this, the sex-gender binarism may not actually suffice in fully explaining the nuances of such a phenomenon. This is a strong argument for transgenderism to be present among forest Tedurays. Yet as can be gleaned from the lively exchange between Schlegel and a forest Teduray, having a penis is more than just a biological fact. This is best expressed in the statement “Yes, of course she has a penis… She is one-who-became-a-woman.” It can therefore be inferred that among the forest Tedurays of Figel, the individual has liberty to decide and choose the fate of his penis. I posit that in this instance, sex or the body is being constructed as evidenced by the existence of the mentefuwaley libun. Theoretically, this assertion is not really new. Simone de Beauvoir (1949) in The Second Sex writes, “The body is not a thing, it is a situation: it is a grasp on the world and a sketch of our projects” (quoted in Moi 1999, 59). To apply, the penis is simply a situation. Butler then only affirms de Beauvoir, while the mentefuwaley libun of the forest Tedurays gives ‘flesh’ (pardon the pun) to the theory. It is my contention that the forest Tedurays socially and culturally perpetuated the reproduction of the ‘sex or body-being-constructed’ when they allowed the mentefuwaley libun as norm.
In Schlegel’s reflection about the phenomenon, he writes:
I learned that in their view of things, what made you really a certain gender was the social role you played: how you dressed, how you wore your hair, what you did all day, how you were addressed by people, what gender you thought of yourself as being (139).
Schlegel’s reflection about gender as a matter of social role is valid; he mirrors the classic sex-gender binarism in feminist theory during the 1970s. However, Butler’s gender performativity provides a better anchor in explaining the mentefuwaley libun. Her theory of gender performativity appropriately resonates the state of being of the mentefuwaley libun.
In Bodies That Matter, Butler (1993, quoted in Moi 1999, 46) emphasizes that the body is material yet constructed. She opposes the essentialist claim that sex determines gender. Instead, she proposes that “regulatory discourses” determine biological facts. Therefore, sex is performative effect of gender. The phenomenon of the mentefuwaley libun strengthens Butler’s assertion and refutes the essentialist notion of sex. How does one become a woman? According to Toril Moi, paraphrasing Butler,
Gender is performative as opposed to gender essentialism; that against the doing of sex, she is asserting the doing of gender. Gender performativity is a 1990s way of speaking of how we fashion ourselves though our acts and choices. Gender performativity means that when most people behave according to certain gender norms, this ensures that the norms are maintained and reinforced.
In the case of Uka, the performative aspect of her gender is integral to her being a mentefuwaley libun of the forest Tedurays. The act of becoming is vital in the performativity of Uka’s gender. The social role of Uka, as the finest bamboo zither player may be another performative aspect of her gender. As Schlegel asserts: “She is really a man, just dressed like a woman!” Incidentally, in the same chapter Schlegel noted meeting a “one-who-became-a-man.” Obviously, he was referring to a lesbian in our gender categorization. Schlegel shares insights which helped shape my broader claim that the existence of the mentefuwaley libun is an articulation of sacred sexuality among the forest Tedurays. Schlegel writes:
So many features of Teduray life—their positive attitude toward erotic pleasure, their concern for families as the context of economic viability, their sturdy commitment to the bearing and raising of children, the often stated belief that people who chose to change gender were excluded and irrelevant to marriage because they were irrelevant to procreation and the total absence of gender politics – provided a social and cultural climate in which anxious concern about gender role switching had no need or reason to exist. (192)
In Chapter 5 entitled “We Were Created to Care for the Forest” Schlegel notes the bawdy humor exchanged between the forest Teduray men and women while planting in their swidden:
Ideng-Emet: “Husband, the way you are poking that stick into the ground reminds me of last night, when you did some splendid thrusting and poking as well!” Mo-Emet: “Wife, if you had as much seed in your loins as you have in that basket, we would surely have too many children!” My usage of the term sacred should not be misconstrued as sacrosanct in the moralistic sense. By sacred here I mean ‘reverently earthy.’ The forest Tedurays believe the forest and everything found in it hallowed. Before planting, they perform ritual-plot ceremonies: in the morning, they sound the gong to announce to the river-spirits their turn to utilize the resources of the river. This reverence is clearly expressed in their cosmology. The nine cosmic realms are a matter of going from one kind of spirit to another. My sense is that their sacred sexuality is deeply rooted in their spirituality. Taken literally, the sexual banter is purely an expression of earthiness; metaphorically, it alludes to an erotic spiritually.
In Chapter 13, “Shamans and Sacred Meals,” Schlegel’s profound meditation upon witnessing the kanduli [5] reads:
I have called the Teduray view of reality their “spirituality” many times…For me, our spirituality is whatever path we choose to journey toward wholeness and meaningfulness. I also like to think of spirituality as our vision of what will make us whole and well. (192)
Schlegel further writes,
Anthropologists and linguists have often discovered that in traditional, relatively isolated societies there is no word for “spiritual”or “sacred”- all of life is inherently spiritual and all things are sacred. (192)
Following Schlegel’s thinking, the mentefuwaley libun, “one-who-became-a-woman” may be a
form of sacred sexuality [6] made available to every forest Teduray because in their view it is a spiritual path. In Chapter 3 “Animals That Fly Are Birds” Schlegel discusses the “gall bladder rule.” He explains the two sides of the rule as:
First you should do everything you could to help each other; and second, you should never do anything to wound another person in body or sensibility; you should never make another person angry or hurt. (57)
He further explains that for the forest Tedurays,
The gall bladder was the center of human life, emotion, will and consciousness. It is what housed one’s state of mind and rational feelings, one’s desires, one’s intentions, one’s delight or misery… The gall bladder figured in a precept that was absolutely central to their notions of how to live their lives: it was “Don’t give anyone a bad gall bladder. (57)
I would surmise that the spirituality of the forest Tedurays is founded on the precept of the gall bladder rule. Being a mentefuwaley libun among the forest Tedurays is not perceived as in conflict with such teaching. If homophobia is unknown to the forest Tedurays, the two-sides-of-the-gallbladder rule is not violated by virtue of being a mentefuwaley libun. Guided in praxis by the gall bladder rule, the sexuality of the mentefuwaley libun is an expression of spirituality among the forest Tedurays of Figel. In closing, I retrace my steps to the forest of Figel and the Teduray’s wisdom of fiyo or just-right. Auxiliary to the precept of the gall bladder is fiyo or just-right and te’te’ or not-right. In the ethics of the Tedurays, things are not absolutely good or bad; they are just-right and not-right. (Schlegel, 57) Allaying my apprehensions earlier about writing a review on a book I fell in love with, I learned from the forest Tedurays that one could do a book review fiyo. Notes [1] What moved me about this account was the cultural sensitivity of both the forest Tedurays and Prof. Schlegel. The forest Tedurays demonstrated sensitivity when they made the perilous trip to save a life. Prof. Schlegel showed sensitivity when he did not make value judgment about the manner by which the forest Tedurays with their shaman would intervene on behalf of Len’s life. Prologue ix-xiv. [2] The forest Tedurays of Figel were massacred by a group of Maguindanaon guerillas when they refused to let them have any of their women, 233. [3] Uka was from another place, Lange-lange, and she came to Figel to play for the author, 137. [4] Also, gender identity: a person’s innate sense of gender; gender expression: the way in which a person presents his or her gender. Gender non-conforming: individuals who regularly transgress conventional gender norms, although they may not be attempting to present themselves as a different gender. (http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Transgender_Basics) [5] The kanduli is a ritual performance periodically offered communal feast filled with spiritual significance. (Schlegel 1999, 190). [6] The very idea of sexuality as sacred, and more specifically, obscenity as an aspect of sacred sexuality, is vital to the wildish nature in Estes (1992, 384). References De Beauvoir, Simone. 1949. The second sex. Trans. H. M. Parshley. New York: Vintage Books. Butler, Judith. 1993. Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of ‘sex.’ New York: Routledge. Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. New York: Routledge. Moi, Toril. 1999. What is a woman? and other essays. Oxford University Press.
Arve Bañez teaaches Political Science at the University of the Philippines in Mindanao.
|
